China in Latin America: September 2024
from China Strategy Initiative
from China Strategy Initiative

China in Latin America: September 2024

A woman dismantles flags after a meeting at the1st Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing January 9, 2015.
A woman dismantles flags after a meeting at the1st Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing January 9, 2015.

This month, China’s engagement with Latin America primarily focused on trade and investment, highlighted by Brazil’s announcement of an interministerial working group to explore the South American country’s entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

September 27, 2024 4:25 pm (EST)

A woman dismantles flags after a meeting at the1st Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing January 9, 2015.
A woman dismantles flags after a meeting at the1st Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing January 9, 2015.
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Chinese Migration: According to AP, thousands of Chinese migrants are moving to Mexico. In 2023, the Mexican government issued 5,070 temporary residency visas, double the number of the previous year.

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Beijing Increases Trade: Paraguayan Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez Lezcano said that Mercosur, the South American trade bloc, would be willing to negotiate a free trade agreement with China if it addresses the trade deficit between the country and the bloc. Peruvian President Dina Boluarte denounced the presence of Chinese vessels fishing illegally in Peruvian waters. The Peruvian government’s antidumping measure against imports of Chinese taffeta, a type of fabric, and polyester also went into effect in September. Meanwhile, in Chile, the Anti-Distortions Commission concluded that China was not dumping Chinese steel into the Chilean market and that the Chilean government should withdraw tariffs on the import of Chinese steel.
 

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The Honduran government reached an agreement with its Chinese counterparts on Honduran exports of fresh melons to China. Ecuador’s Agricultural Minister Danilo Palacios also announced that the South American country would soon begin exporting milk products to China and that China’s Vice Minister of Customs would be visiting Ecuador later in September. 

On September 19, Republican U.S. Senator Marco Rubio proposed enacting a measure to bar Chinese manufacturers from evading tariffs by placing factories in other countries, such as Mexico.

New Investments: Chinese electric vehicle maker BYD paused its decision on whether it will build a car production facility in Mexico until after U.S. elections in November. In Bolivia, the government’s state-owned lithium company announced that China’s CBC was on a shortlist of four companies to advance to the next phase of a bid to develop several lithium extraction plants in Bolivia. In Venezuela, the national assembly ratified a new investment deal with China. Although few details have been published about the deal, it is likely to focus particularly on Venezuela’s special economic zones and on additional protections for Chinese investments in the country. 

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On September 8, Honduras’s Tourism Institute announced that Honduras had been included as one of the major destinations for Chinese tourists. From September 12 to 14, China hosted the fourth Ministerial Conference of the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum in Qionghai, Hainan Province. During the conference, Guyana’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugh Todd signed memoranda of understanding on trade facilitation and green development with China’s Vice Minister of Commerce and International Trade Representative Wang Shouwen.

The South China Morning Post reported that the Brazilian government has formed an interministerial working group to assess Brazil’s entry into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the expectation that Brazil will formally join the BRI in November when Xi visits the South American country. Brazil is also analyzing the potential impact BRI membership will have on U.S.-Brazil relations, especially if former President Donald Trump wins in November. Lastly, the Boston University Global Development Policy Center published a new working paper examining the determinants of Chinese development financing in Latin America between 2008 and 2019.

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Latin America

The South China Morning Post reported that the Brazilian government has formed an interministerial working group to assess Brazil’s entry into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the expectation that Brazil will formally join the BRI in November when Xi visits the South American country. Brazil is also analyzing the potential impact BRI membership will have on U.S.-Brazil relations, especially if former President Donald Trump wins in November. Lastly, the Boston University Global Development Policy Center published a new working paper examining the determinants of Chinese development financing in Latin America between 2008 and 2019.

Deeper Security Integration: Chinese troops participated in Brazil’s annual Operation Formosa military exercises the week of September 10, where U.S. troops were also participants. On September 9, Nicaragua’s Police Chief Francisco Díaz had met with China’s Public Security Minister Wan Xiaohong to discuss deepening cooperation on matters of public security. The two sides signed an agreement under which China pledged to provide technical assistance to Nicaragua’s police force to help it combat terrorism, narco-trafficking, and cybercrimes. 

Beijing’s Diplomacy: At the UN General Assembly (UNGA), Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced that Brazil and China had proposed a six-point plan to initiate a peace dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. Also during UNGA, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his counterpart in Panama, Javier Martínez-Acha, where the Chinese foreign minister reaffirmed the importance of ties between their two countries. Earlier in the month, Brazil hosted the first China-Latin America and Caribbean States Roundtable on Human Rights in Rio de Janeiro. 

In Nicaragua, the government of Nicaraguan autocrat Daniel Ortega inaugurated a new Confucius Institute at the National Autonomous University in Managua. Rosario Murillo, Nicaragua’s vice president and Ortega’s wife, and Laureano Ortega Murillo, Ortega’s son, presided over the event.

 

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.