The Future of Democracy in India
from Women Around the World, Women and Foreign Policy Program, Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy, and Women’s Political Leadership
from Women Around the World, Women and Foreign Policy Program, Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy, and Women’s Political Leadership

The Future of Democracy in India

Women line up to cast their votes outside a polling station during the sixth phase of the general election in Sonipat, in the northern Indian state of Haryana, India, May 25, 2024.
Women line up to cast their votes outside a polling station during the sixth phase of the general election in Sonipat, in the northern Indian state of Haryana, India, May 25, 2024. REUTERS/Anushree Fadnavis

Indian voters signaled they want change, but achieving change requires restoring democratic practices.

August 1, 2024 8:42 am (EST)

Women line up to cast their votes outside a polling station during the sixth phase of the general election in Sonipat, in the northern Indian state of Haryana, India, May 25, 2024.
Women line up to cast their votes outside a polling station during the sixth phase of the general election in Sonipat, in the northern Indian state of Haryana, India, May 25, 2024. REUTERS/Anushree Fadnavis
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

The outcome of India’s elections this year represent an opportunity for the world’s largest country to regain its democracy, but that outcome will depend on mobilization by Indians and an assertive opposition led by Rahul Gandhi, who campaigned on the theme of restoring democracy and protecting India’s secular constitution from attempts to propagate Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, in India by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dominant Bharatiya Janata Party.  

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While voters delivered Modi a severe rebuke in June by handing him a minority share of the votes, he was able to form a government by relying on coalition partners. That rebuke, together with the striking comeback of the once-dominant Indian National Congress and its formation of a significant opposition bloc, showed that competitive multiparty elections are still possible in the world’s largest country, once known as the world’s largest democracy. But the steady erosion of political and civil liberties, institutional checks on executive power, and courts’ independence beginning in 2008 led democracy watchdog Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) to downgrade India to an “electoral autocracy” in 2018, and this year the organization called India “one of the worst autocratizing countries,” citing Modi’s widening suppression of political opponents, the media, religious and ethnic minorities, and civil society organizations. Women remain highly underrepresented in government and their rights continue to be circumscribed by law and custom. 

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In recent years, Modi has ratcheted up the repression of journalists, using Pegasus spyware, hacking, raids of news organizations including the BBC as well as local papers, and sham charges against investigative journalists like Rana Ayyub. His primary political opponent, Rahul Gandhi, was sentenced for defaming him and stripped of his seat in the Indian Parliament. Modi has gone after other opponents with the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, counterterrorism laws, and a new online censorship bill. Over seventeen thousand nongovernmental organizations, including Oxfam and CARE International, have been harassed and denied foreign funding, replicating a practice in Russia and other autocratic states. Academic freedom has been quelled, according to Freedom House’s 2024 report, leading to the dismissal of professors critical of the government. The Supreme Court upheld Modi’s revocation of the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, as part of a sweeping campaign to strip Muslims of their rights and advance an ultranationalist Hindu vision of India. 

Despite having a woman in the presidency, a largely symbolic office, India’s women have not prospered under Modi. Women only comprise 14.7 percent of the legislature, and a promised reserved quota of 30 percent in the lower house will not materialize until a long-delayed census is conducted, possibly in 2028 or 2029. Gender inequality is deeply entrenched in economic, cultural, and legal forms, and attempts to advance women’s rights in India have sometimes backfired, according to research by political scientist Rachel Brulé. Reserved quotas have enabled women to press for inheritance and property rights in some cases, but in others created a backlash and an upsurge in female infanticide. That practice has led to an enduring imbalance in women as 48.4 percent of the population. According to social scientist Anoop Sadanandan, the preference for sons is especially pronounced in India’s Hindu states, and overall women there receive less education and are poorer and unhealthier. 

The fate of democracy in India carries consequences for the rest of the world. Arresting the global rise of autocracy will likely not be possible without a return to democracy in India. As the world’s largest country—its 1.4 billion people make up 18 percent of the world’s total population—India’s sheer size alone gives it enormous sway. Alliances among autocratic leaders also extend their individual clout. Modi has banded together with another dominant autocrat, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and visited him on his first trip abroad since the formation of his new government to strike new deals on economic and military cooperation. India is the second-largest importer of Russian oil, and his bear hug of the Russian leader underlines his rejection of sanctions and the West’s attempt to halt Russia’s brutal ongoing war in Ukraine. 

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Despite making support for democracy a part of its foreign policy, the United States has not made supporting democracy in India a priority. The United States, eager to court India as part of its strategy to contain China’s global muscle-flexing, issued tepid lamentations about Modi’s visit and continued embrace of Putin. The White House also welcomed Modi on a state visit last year and will continue to prioritize India’s role in the Indo-Pacific over any serious pressure to restore its democracy. That is a mistake: a democratic India makes for a stronger ally with an enduring base of support at home. 

This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

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