The Indo-Pacific: Where Scale Matters

The Indo-Pacific: Where Scale Matters

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s guided-missile frigate Yueyang takes part in a China-Thailand joint naval exercise off the southern port city of Shanwei, China, May 6, 2019.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s guided-missile frigate Yueyang takes part in a China-Thailand joint naval exercise off the southern port city of Shanwei, China, May 6, 2019. Reuters

The United States is lagging far behind China when it comes to military supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, where Beijing has increased pressure on long-time U.S. allies and partners.

May 2, 2025 3:14 pm (EST)

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s guided-missile frigate Yueyang takes part in a China-Thailand joint naval exercise off the southern port city of Shanwei, China, May 6, 2019.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s guided-missile frigate Yueyang takes part in a China-Thailand joint naval exercise off the southern port city of Shanwei, China, May 6, 2019. Reuters
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Greetings from Honolulu, where a delegation of CFR members is just finishing up a fact-finding visit to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and some of its components. INDOPACOM is the combatant command for more than half the world—from Hollywood to Bollywood and from polar bears to penguins, as they say. It faces multiple challenges, including North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile activity and the increasing activity of Russia’s Pacific forces, but its overwhelming focus is on China—which the military calls the “pacing threat” for the United States.

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The Chinese Communist Party, with President Xi Jinping at its helm, appears keen to achieve regional hegemony and redraw longstanding borders in the Indo-Pacific by “unifying” with the island of Taiwan and solidifying its expansive territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.

Over the last two decades, China has undertaken the largest peacetime military buildup in recent history, enabling it to project power far beyond its land borders and littoral waters, as well as to challenge U.S. and allied military primacy in the Indo-Pacific. By mobilizing its immense industrial base, China has built a substantial maritime fighting force—now the largest in the world by some measures, with more warships (370) than the entire U.S. Navy (296). And China’s navy is focused on largely just one region, while the U.S. Navy is stretched across the globe. 

China’s military continues to grow at breakneck production rates that the United States and its combined regional allies have yet to match. Indeed, according to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, China now possesses more than two hundred times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. Its air force and strategic nuclear forces have also surged. Its missile capabilities are worrisome, as is its determination to build out its nuclear arsenal, with the goal of fielding more than 1,500 warheads by the mid-2030s.

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The U.S. maintains a significant qualitative advantage in a number of critical areas. For example, the CFR delegation spent a day out at sea on a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine. And there seemed to be a consensus—from the sailors on board to the admirals back in headquarters—that U.S. superiority undersea gives the United States a significant edge in any potential conflict. But the delegation heard repeatedly that scale, and the military axiom that “quantity has a quality all to its own,” is the crux of China’s strategy to achieve military supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. And on that score, the United States is lagging far behind. 

Concurrent with this military buildup, China has ratcheted up pressure on long-time U.S. allies and partners in the region by militarizing contested territories in the South and East China Seas and increasing its long-time pressure campaign on Taiwan. These actions include China’s recent attempts to create facts on the ground to claim the Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoal and its move last week to plant a flag on Sandy Cay, which the Philippines also claims.

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On the issue of Taiwan, China has begun to ramp up large, live-fire military drills in close proximity to the island, akin to dress rehearsals for blockades, missile strikes, air raids, amphibious assaults, and other offensive military operations. It has also severed a number of critical undersea cables connected to Taiwan’s outlying islands and probed Taiwan’s defenses with a steady stream of incursions into air and water around Taiwan. Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, commander of INDOPACOM, told the Senate Committee on Armed Services last month that China’s People’s Liberation Army increased its military pressure against Taiwan by 300 percent in 2024. In recent months, China has also debuted its formidable amphibious assault capabilities, including massive floating bridges and amphibious assault craft, which it could utilize in a Taiwan invasion scenario. 

The United States has watched as Beijing mobilized capital and manipulated its investment policy, even as China’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth has slowed, in pursuit of its long-term economic and security goals. Needless to say, Beijing’s scale advantage may prove to be the decisive factor in determining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.  

My colleague Rush Doshi, who joined the delegation with us and is the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies and Director of CFR’s China Strategy Initiative, made this very point in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs with former Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. They argued “this is an era in which strategic advantage will once again accrue to those who can operate at scale. China possesses scale, and the United States does not—at least not by itself.” Only when combined with its major allies, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, could the United States collectively marshal more industrial capacity, long-term investment, and human capital to “outscale” China and its partners. As Rush and Kurt underscore in their essay, “because its only viable path lies in coalition with others, Washington would be particularly unwise to go it alone in a complex global competition.”

It came as no surprise, therefore, that when even as we were discussing the relative strengths of various weapon systems, the hardy perennial issue of trade came up: How the tariffs are affecting relations with allies in the region the United States might well need to deter and defeat potential China aggression. As one of my interlocutors noted, there must be something between tariffs and traditional free trade agreements. It may or may not all come down to trade, but the United States would do well to connect the dots between tariff actions and other domains where it needs allies and partners to achieve strategic objectives.

To end on an optimistic note: While it was a sobering visit, one of the United States’ absolute advantages is the unmatched professionalism, discipline, and dedication of the men and women of the armed services. From its incredibly thoughtful leaders to the sailors who serve for months on end in an austere and demanding environment below the waves, one cannot help but be impressed and reassured.

We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected]

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.