A Third Year of War: Dried-Up Aid Pulls Sudan Further Into Chaos

A Third Year of War: Dried-Up Aid Pulls Sudan Further Into Chaos

Amid a landscape of destruction, displaced Sudanese take refuge at a school-turned-shelter in Port Sudan.
Amid a landscape of destruction, displaced Sudanese take refuge at a school-turned-shelter in Port Sudan. Abrahim Mohammed Ishac/Reuters

As Sudan plunges into another chapter of fighting, the country is enduring the world’s worst humanitarian crisis at a time of drastically shrinking foreign aid.   

April 14, 2025 8:55 am (EST)

Amid a landscape of destruction, displaced Sudanese take refuge at a school-turned-shelter in Port Sudan.
Amid a landscape of destruction, displaced Sudanese take refuge at a school-turned-shelter in Port Sudan. Abrahim Mohammed Ishac/Reuters
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Two years of war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have created a humanitarian disaster. The country is coping with mass displacement, famine, and war crimes against its civilians while its most crucial aid source—the United States—sharply pulls back on assistance. Sudan’s third year of war could be shaping up to be one of its most brutal.

What is the situation in Sudan?

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In March 2025, the Sudanese army announced that it had regained control of the presidential palace and central bank in Khartoum—a major development after the RSF seized large swaths of the country early in the war. The RSF still maintains its hold in much of western Sudan, effectively leaving the country “divided in two,” Al Jazeera reported. Clashes have spilled over into every state, with most of the fighting concentrated in Darfur and Gezira. 

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Both sides have fought viciously, fueling their own war crimes and atrocities, including gender-based violence, and spurring mass migration and famine. Since war broke out on April 15, 2023, more than twelve million have been displaced, almost nine million within the country, with hundreds of thousands more fleeing to neighboring country camps. At least 150,000 people have been killed, according to conservative estimates. 

Famine has been confirmed across at least ten areas in the country, home to hundreds of thousands of people. Malnutrition rates are among the highest worldwide. Outbreaks of diseases including cholera, dengue, malaria, measles, polio, and rubella have run rampant; with many health-care facilities defunct, medical assistance is virtually nonexistent.

“People are dying of hunger and disease more than bullets. Hospitals have been destroyed, health-care workers have fled or been killed, and the entire health system is collapsing. The situation is dire—yet the world remains silent,” Yasir Elamin, president of the Sudanese American Physicians Association, tells CFR.

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Well over half of the population—30.4 million people—are in need of humanitarian aid. 

What mark has the USAID freeze left on the crisis?

The United States has been Sudan’s biggest aid donor. In 2024, Washington put forward 44 percent of the country’s $1.8 billion humanitarian response through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

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Washington was also one of the “more flexible” humanitarian funders, according to the Swiss-based nonprofit ACAPS. USAID facilitated essential administrative and support costs and coordinating capacity to ensure other aid organizations, whether local or international (such as the UN World Food Program), could carry out on-the-ground work. 

Then in February 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a cut to 83 percent of USAID programs. Prior to that, USAID had already committed nearly $126 million toward Sudan for this year, and it was not clear whether any of this funding would be delivered. Trump’s Africa team—Sudan envoy among them—has still not been fully staffed.

Already 80 percent of emergency kitchens have shut down; despite the State Department issuing an exemption for emergency food, confusion over what that means in practice has shuttered operations. Infection rates are likely to surge as “millions contend with the closures” of health-care programs to combat diseases such as HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, says Ahmed Abdullah Ismail, head of the Paris-based Sudanese nonprofit Mashad. Funding for essential medical goods has vanished. 

Local workers have said the funding slash is their biggest roadblock yet. “There have been many crises in Sudan which have affected the work of the humanitarian sector, but the USAID cuts have been the worst I’ve ever seen,” says Muna Eltahir, a Sudanese humanitarian worker with more than thirty years of experience. 

What is Sudan’s outlook as it enters year three of war? 

This year, the United Nations’ consolidated aid appeal totals $4.16 billion to reach nearly 21 million people in Sudan. The expected shortfall of aid will be felt by millions more than are already affected, experts say.  

“The United States has dismantled its own capacity to respond to humanitarian crises as the famine in Sudan threatens to be the deadliest in decades,” CFR Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies Michelle Gavin says. “As Sudan moves toward de facto partition and the cohesion of the main antagonists weakens, the plight of Sudanese civilians is going from bad to worse.”

Also arousing concern is an aid contagion effect of sorts: in USAID’s wake, the United Kingdom followed suit, announcing a 40 percent drop in its aid to Sudan. Others including France and Germany have also recently done the same. Meanwhile, with conflict in neighboring South Sudan igniting, the prospect of the countries’ fighting merging into a regional war looms. 

Both sides in Sudan’s civil war are responsible for generating the hunger crisis and abuses, say local and foreign relief workers, with peace prospects still grim. Without conflict resolution and continued efforts by outside parties, the suffering will continue—and without aid, the suffering will only get exponentially worse, they warn.

Will Merrow created the graphic for this article.

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