What We’re Watching Around the Globe in 2025

What We’re Watching Around the Globe in 2025

A man waves the independence-era Syrian flag over Damascus’ central Umayyad Square on December 11, 2024.
A man waves the independence-era Syrian flag over Damascus’ central Umayyad Square on December 11, 2024. Bakr Alkasem/AFP/Getty Images

To gain some insight into the year ahead, CFR fellows highlight some of the global developments they will be looking out for.

December 20, 2024 3:08 pm (EST)

A man waves the independence-era Syrian flag over Damascus’ central Umayyad Square on December 11, 2024.
A man waves the independence-era Syrian flag over Damascus’ central Umayyad Square on December 11, 2024. Bakr Alkasem/AFP/Getty Images
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Michael Froman is president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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This year saw no shortage of tectonic geopolitical developments: the entry of long-neutral Sweden into NATO, Ukrainian forces’ incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, Israeli strikes in Iran and Lebanon, the election of Donald Trump, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol soon after he declared martial law.

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The year also saw the continuation of longer-term trends that were no less consequential, from ever-improving AI to the increasing division of the world into blocs to the growing threat of climate change (with 2024 ranking as the hottest year on record).

As the saying goes, predictions are hard, especially about the future. But to gain some insight into the year ahead, I sat down this week with a group of CFR’s fellows to ask them what they would be looking out for in 2025.

The Middle East seems poised to dominate headlines. Will post-Assad Syria unify disparate opposition groups? Or will it remain a failed state, only this time, run by Islamists? Syria’s fate will not only define the future for the country’s twenty-three million people but also have a significant impact on its immediate neighbors: Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel.

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As for Iran, will 2025 be the year the country races to develop an actual nuclear capability? On one hand, in times of crisis such as the present, Tehran tends to avoid provocations, and so it might seek negotiations with the United States, particularly before European sanctions snap back. On the other hand, given that Iran has witnessed the degradation of it major proxies (Hamas and Hezbollah), the loss of its chief client state (Syria), the fecklessness of its missile capability (against the defenses of Israel, the United States, and other partners), and the destruction of its air defenses (by Israel’s recent strikes), the regime might well be more incentivized than ever to develop the ultimate deterrent.

And then there is the Israel factor: Israeli leaders are filled with confidence after defying outside entreaties to end the war in Gaza and de-escalate their country’s conflicts with Iran and Hezbollah. Euphoric and emboldened, they may decide that this is the year to strike Iran’s nuclear program and set it back years.

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What does 2025 hold for another war zone, Ukraine? Trump has promised to end the conflict there, but the fact remains that the Ukrainian and Russian visions of a settlement differ wildly, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown little interest in serious negotiations.

Rather than end, the conflict may well escalate in 2025. This week, a Ukrainian operative assassinated a high-ranking Russian general in Moscow, and earlier, Putin threatened to target “decision-making centers” in Kyiv with a new ballistic missile. But over the course of next year, Putin will likely face mounting domestic problems. Russia’s central bank has forecast economic growth of 0.5 to 1.5 percent in 2025, down from 3.5 to 4 percent in 2024, suggesting that the wartime boom may have run its course.

A related question is how far China is prepared to go in supporting its “no limits” partner, Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping has evinced little outward disapproval of Putin’s war in Ukraine—to the contrary, China is supplying vital military technology and support to Russia—but 2025 may be the year we start to see slivers of daylight between the two revisionist powers, as each tries to cut deals with Trump and the constraints on their alignment become more evident.

China remains preoccupied with Taiwan. Last week, China held its largest maritime military exercises in decades. Involving nearly ninety vessels, the drills seemed designed to send the message that Beijing had the power to blockade the island and prevent U.S. allies from coming to its rescue.

The return of Trump cuts both ways for Taiwan. On one hand, the president-elect has promised to sharpen U.S. competition with Beijing. On the other, he seems to harbor no affinity for the democratic island and has criticized its success in becoming a semiconductor powerhouse, in his view, at the United States’ expense. President Joe Biden mused about coming to the defense of Taiwan in the context of a Chinese invasion; Trump has suggested he might slap tariffs on China instead.

The biggest humanitarian crisis in the world at the moment is the civil war in Sudan, which has been raging since the spring of 2023. The crisis is only expected to get worse in 2025, as outside powers—including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—continue to meddle in the conflict.

Elsewhere on the continent, it will be worth watching the simmering conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, the chronic Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria, South Africa’s G-20 presidency, and potentially volatile elections expected in 2025 in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Cameroon.

Latin American nations, already struggling to absorb twenty million forcibly displaced migrants, are bracing for a renewed exodus from Venezuela as Nicolas Maduro holds onto the presidency in defiance of the 2024 election results.

Against this geopolitical backdrop are some worrisome economic trends: potential tension between Trump and the Federal Reserve, the impact of tariffs—and retaliation—on China as well as on U.S. allies and partners, the unsustainable trajectory of U.S. deficits and debt. And all these trends are mounting at a time when the markets are “priced for perfection,” meaning they assume the best about the year ahead.

Some of these concerns were shared by a group of twenty-five business leaders I met with earlier in the month as part of CFR’s CEO Leadership Circle. They expressed anxiety about tariffs, about a potential clash with the Fed, and about heightened geopolitical competition with China. They also expressed unease about changes in U.S. immigration policy that could shrink the labor pool.

But overall, the CEOs were notably bullish on the U.S. economy, expecting continued strong growth, low unemployment, falling interest rates, and lower energy costs—not to mention less regulation and antitrust enforcement under the Trump administration.

Another source of optimism among business leaders: the United States’ advantage in cutting-edge technologies, especially AI. They hoped the incoming administration would strike the right balance between making sure that AI is used responsibly and encouraging innovation.

Of course, if the past is prologue, the year ahead will be filled with surprises—some good, some bad—that no one will have predicted. In 2025, the old cliché will certainly hold true: expect the unexpected.

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.