Where the China-Russia Partnership Is Headed in Seven Charts and Maps

Where the China-Russia Partnership Is Headed in Seven Charts and Maps

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024. Maxim Shipenkov/Reuters

Beijing’s and Moscow’s relationship has strengthened militarily, economically, and diplomatically in the past two decades, demonstrating their commitment to a “no limits” partnership.

December 12, 2024 11:31 am (EST)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024. Maxim Shipenkov/Reuters
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Over the past decade, China and Russia have deepened their diplomatic relationship despite a long and complicated history marked by both cooperation and strategic rivalry. Their partnership—the strongest it’s been in centuries—is driven largely by a common goal: to challenge the U.S.-led world order that has defined the post-World War II era.

More From Our Experts

In 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin said that their countries’ partnership had “no limits” [PDF] and vowed to deepen collaboration on various fronts. The announcement came days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some experts question the depth of their strategic relationship, arguing that the countries’ alignment is driven by their shared hostility toward the United States rather than by any natural affinity.

More on:

China

Russia

U.S. Foreign Policy

The War in Ukraine

China 360

This year, China and Russia will pass the seventy-fifth anniversary of their diplomatic relations. CFR’s Robert D. Blackwill and Center for a New American Security’s Richard Fontaine dive into what this will mean for U.S. foreign policy in their new Council Special Report.

The following seven visualizations highlight China and Russia’s military, economic, and diplomatic cooperation in recent years.

Growing Military Ties

China’s and Russia’s defense ties have been cemented since 2014, the year Russia annexed Crimea. Their bilateral military exercises have also increased in frequency, scale, and complexity in the past two decades. Beijing and Moscow are jointly developing missile warning systems and boosting collaboration in space, including by integrating their satellite-based navigation systems.

More From Our Experts

Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, China and Russia have held several joint military drills, which have taken place in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. Since 2012, the two countries have performed bilateral naval simulations in geopolitically strategic seas, such as the East China Sea and Sea of Japan (often referred to as the East Sea). The seas include the Indo-Pacific first island chain, a critical formation for U.S. foreign policy that traverses the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, and the Malay peninsula. In 2017, China’s and Russia’s militaries conducted a drill in the Baltic Sea, practicing live fire against land and air targets. 

Complementary Economies

Although China’s and Russia’s bilateral trade has increased over the past twenty years, their economic partnership is highly lopsided. Russia depends far more on China than vice versa; China is currently Russia’s number-one trade partner, but Russia was only China’s sixth-largest as of 2023. However, both countries mutually benefit from their trade relationship. Russia relies on Chinese companies and banks for critical investment in its energy and telecommunications infrastructure, while China benefits from Russia’s abundance of oil and natural gas to meet its enormous energy needs. Experts call their relationship complementary economies.

More on:

China

Russia

U.S. Foreign Policy

The War in Ukraine

China 360

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s exports have become a lifeline for the Russian economy, especially after the United States and European countries sanctioned Russian resources and froze Russian assets. In 2023, China-Russia trade reached an all-time high of $240 billion, compared to their bilateral trade of $147 billion in 2021 before the war in Ukraine. China’s exports to Russia also continue to grow at an increasingly rapid pace, supporting the Russian economy, which grew by 3.6 percent in 2023.

Increased Diplomatic Cooperation

China and Russia coordinate in international institutions to expand their influence and reshape global governance in their favor. Since the founding of the Russian Federation, neither country has vetoed a UN Security Council resolution proposed by the other. Indeed, the two frequently align in their voting patterns. They have dually vetoed sixteen Security Council resolutions, often against U.S. foreign policy interests, and Beijing has not opposed a resolution without Moscow since 1999. Of the twenty-three cases in which the Russian Federation exercised its veto power alone, China abstained twenty times.

They are also jointly expanding their global influence through newly developed “non-Western” multilateral institutions, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). BRICS was founded in 2009 with original members Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and joined the following year by South Africa. The group has since grown to nine members, adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in 2024.

BRICS communiqués offer insight into the foreign policy positions of the organization members, and their positions on Ukraine and the Gaza Strip especially resemble the preferred views of China and Russia. The same goes for SCO countries, which have supported China’s Belt and Road Initiative and have condemned Western sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

BRICS also seeks to move away from reliance on the U.S. dollar and Western institutions for financial transactions. The group intends to create an alternative global financial system through its New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which were established to rival Western-dominated multilateral financial institutions the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respectively. BRICS Pay, an alternative payment mechanism, was created in 2024 to compete with the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), a secure messaging network for financial institutions.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Trade

President Trump doubled almost all aluminum and steel import tariffs, seeking to curb China’s growing dominance in global trade. These six charts show the tariffs’ potential economic effects.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.