Who Controls the Panama Canal?

Who Controls the Panama Canal?

The cargo ship Cosco Houston tests a new set of locks at the Panama Canal as part of a canal expansion project, in June 2016.
The cargo ship Cosco Houston tests a new set of locks at the Panama Canal as part of a canal expansion project, in June 2016. Carlos Jasso/Reuters

Panama has owned and administered the Panama Canal for nearly three decades. President Trump wants to change that to counter growing Chinese influence in Latin America.

Last updated January 29, 2025 2:05 pm (EST)

The cargo ship Cosco Houston tests a new set of locks at the Panama Canal as part of a canal expansion project, in June 2016.
The cargo ship Cosco Houston tests a new set of locks at the Panama Canal as part of a canal expansion project, in June 2016. Carlos Jasso/Reuters
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to regain U.S. ownership of the Panama Canal, which the United States previously controlled until a treaty transferred full ownership to Panama in 1999. Trump’s bluntly stated desire, alongside comments he has made about acquiring Greenland, would violate the international principle of sovereignty and decades of U.S. foreign policy norms if translated into action. The canal facilitates hundreds of billions of dollars of trade each year. It is a central point for international commerce, vital to U.S. supply chains, and critical to Panama’s standing as a regional trade hub. Yet, China’s growing commercial ties to Panama and the region have fueled U.S. concerns about Beijing’s broader role in global shipping and port operations.

Why does the canal matter?

More From Our Experts

The fifty-one-mile long canal connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and is a critical global maritime passageway. By allowing vessels to bypass the lengthy trip around the southernmost tip of South America, the canal significantly reduces both the time and cost of shipping. Upwards of thirteen thousand ships—representing between 5 and 6 percent of global trade—pass through the canal each year.

More on:

Panama

United States

Trade

Supply Chains

Latin America

The canal is vital to both the U.S. and Panamanian economies. The United States remains the canal’s biggest user, with some 40 percent of all U.S. container traffic traversing it annually. Meanwhile, revenue from the canal made up about 4 percent of Panama’s gross domestic product in 2024. Other major users of the waterway include Chile, China, Japan, and South Korea.

In 2023, canal authorities increased the fees for passing ships and limited the number that could cross each day after water levels fell to record lows amid a prolonged drought. While levels have since climbed, experts say the need remains for new investments in the canal’s water management systems as extreme weather events and other climate disruptions increasingly challenge global supply chains.

Why does Trump want to retake control of the canal?

Trump has accused Panama of charging U.S. ships exorbitant rates to transit the canal, which he said was “foolishly” given away by President Jimmy Carter as part of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties signed with Panama in 1977. Trump has also alleged that China secretly runs the canal and said he would not rule out using U.S. military force to retake control.

More From Our Experts

“Trump seems to be making an example out of Panama with the goal of getting other regional leaders to think twice before they take any bold steps to deepen ties with Beijing,” said Will Freeman, CFR fellow for Latin America Studies.

Does China control the canal?

There is no evidence that the Chinese government controls the canal. However, a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings, a Hong Kong-based conglomerate and one of the world’s leading container terminal operators, has managed two ports—at Balboa on the Pacific coast and at Cristóbal on the Atlantic coast—since 1997. Some experts say this raises concerns about potential Chinese influence over the ports, as Beijing’s national security laws now extend to Hong Kong.

More on:

Panama

United States

Trade

Supply Chains

Latin America

Former Republican Senator Marco Rubio, now Trump’s secretary of state, has criticized Chinese influence over the canal. In his Senate confirmation hearing, he said that Beijing, through the expansion of Chinese-owned companies, has “the ability to turn the canal into a choke point in a moment of conflict,” which is “a direct threat to the interests and the national security of the United States.”

Over the past two decades, China has developed close economic ties with many Latin American countries. Beijing is currently South America’s top trading partner and a major source of foreign direct investment and energy and infrastructure lending, including through its Belt and Road Initiative—of which Panama is a member. China has also been involved in several infrastructure projects in Panama, including the construction of a cruise-ship terminal and a convention center.

What is the United States’ history with the canal?

The United States gained the right to construct the artificial waterway in 1903 after backing Panama’s bid to break away from Colombia, and the canal officially opened to traffic in 1914. The United States owned and operated the canal until 1977, when Carter negotiated the canal treaties amid Panama City’s growing demands for sovereignty and Carter’s desire for better relations with Latin America. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties established joint U.S.-Panamanian authority over the canal until 1999, at which point the United States relinquished full control of the canal to the Panama Canal Authority, an autonomous government agency of Panama.

However, the transfer of ownership was controversial. Some lawmakers staunchly opposed relinquishing U.S. control, saying the decision diminished U.S. influence in the region. In his 1976 campaign to become the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan argued that the United States was the “rightful owner” of the canal. Additionally, many policymakers saw the canal as essential for ensuring uninterrupted access to global shipping routes and believed maintaining control was necessary to safeguard U.S. economic interests abroad. 

Under the treaties, the United States has the right to act if there’s a military threat to the canal’s neutrality, but that doesn’t enable Washington to unilaterally reassume ownership—and experts say doing so would violate international law. Today, many experts see the treaties as having heralded a new era of U.S.-Latin America relations.

How has Panama responded?

Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino swiftly rebuked Trump’s comments, asserting that “there’s no possibility of opening any kind of conversation around [transferring canal ownership]” and denying any Chinese involvement in the canal’s operations. He also added that shipping fees are calculated the same way for every vessel that traverses the canal. Mulino, who has pledged greater cooperation with the United States, reiterated his position after Trump again mentioned regaining control of the waterway in his inaugural address.

Michael Bricknell and Will Merrow created the graphics for this In Brief.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Trade

President Trump doubled almost all aluminum and steel import tariffs, seeking to curb China’s growing dominance in global trade. These six charts show the tariffs’ potential economic effects.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.