Asia

Sri Lanka

  • Sri Lanka
    The Geopolitical Consequences of the Sri Lankan Election
    Sri Lankans went to the polls November 16 to elect a president, and former Secretary of Defense Gotabaya Rajapaksa was declared the winner on November 17. Sri Lanka faces significant national security challenges, and has become a focus of geopolitical competition. Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, a retired career member of the U.S. Foreign Service, was U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka (1992-1995), U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, the first woman director of the Foreign Service Institute, and the author or co-author of three books about South Asia. She has been involved with U.S.-Sri Lankan relations for decades. I asked her about the geopolitical implications of this election. A discussion focused on the human rights issues at stake in this election appears here. Who were Sri Lankans choosing for president? The incumbent, Maithripala Sirisena, chose not to run, and his predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who presided over the end of the country’s long civil war, faced term limits. Both were originally from the left-leaning Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPF), but Sirisena had governed in a turbulent alliance with the traditionally right-of-center United National Front (UNF). Uncharacteristically for Sri Lanka, there were some thirty-five candidates contesting this election. The two most prominent were from these same two parties: SLPF, now called the Sri Lanka People’s Party (SLPP), and UNF. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, SLPP’s candidate, is the brother of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and was defense chief in his brother’s administration. Sajith Premadasa, the UNF standard-bearer, served as housing minister in the Sirisena government. He was a young student when his father, former President Ranasinghe Premadasa, was assassinated in 1993. What were the most significant campaign issues? The most important issues for the country are security, ethnic peace, and the economy. Sri Lanka’s long civil war ended in a victory for the army, but reconciliation among the ethnic groups has not made much progress, and the “Easter bombings” that shook the island in April opened up new wounds in the country’s ethnic tapestry. Gotabaya Rajapaksa campaigned on security, focusing on his experience as defense chief. He and his family are canny politicians with an especially strong base along the south coast. His primary opponent, Sajith Premadasa, ran on “kitchen table issues,” promising concrete benefits. He has been in politics for a couple of decades, but this was his first high-profile election. What are U.S. national interests in Sri Lanka? Sri Lanka is located at a critical spot for Indian Ocean security. The United States also has a strong interest in preventing a recurrence of the civil war that raged for decades in Sri Lanka, and especially in preventing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam from resuming their campaign of terrorism. Sri Lanka has been a good commercial partner, though it is a relatively small market. How does Sri Lanka fit into the U.S. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy? Both the emerging U.S.-Sri Lankan security relationship and the country’s relatively successful economy make it a natural partner in the Indo-Pacific region. It boasts virtually universal literacy and an educated labor force, and has been trying to position its ports as gateways for its South Asian neighbors. Sri Lanka’s politicians are split on the Indo-Pacific strategy. During the Rajapaksas’ previous time in power from 2005 to 2015, U.S. military cooperation with Sri Lanka was limited, largely due to U.S. human rights concerns. In the past few years, some left-of-center parties expressed skepticism of security ties with the United States, which they saw as undercutting their traditional nonalignment. Gotabaya Rajapaksa has said little on that subject, however. The coalition in power for the past four years saw a benefit in the kind of balance offered by the strategy, as it worked in close cooperation with the United States and India. Sri Lanka has two important relationships in the region: India and China. Both have deep roots. India’s ethnic ties with Sri Lanka’s 21 percent Tamil population have been both a bond and a complication. Some of India’s Tamil political parties supported the Tamil separatism that fueled Sri Lanka’s civil war. On the other hand, the current Indian government, and several of its predecessors, have worked hard to build up strategic ties with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s ties with China go back to the early 1950s, when a rice-rubber barter deal resolved an economic crisis for both, while running Sri Lanka afoul of the anti-China legislation then in force in the United States. Ties with Beijing are likely to remain important. There’s been a lot of U.S. media coverage of Sri Lanka as the prime example of the potential costs to sovereignty of China’s Belt and Road projects. What does this portend for Sri Lanka-China ties? China pumped massive infrastructure into Sri Lanka after the end of the civil war in 2009, building roads, electricity generating plants, and most famously, a new port at Hambantota, a town in the southwest corner of the island that has important constituencies for both the leading presidential contenders. This assistance has been popular, despite some criticism of the quality of what the Chinese built, and despite concerns about the level of debt Sri Lanka has incurred. China has always provided some level of military equipment to Sri Lanka. In recent years it has moved more strongly into naval equipment. What are the stakes for the United States in this election? The United States had difficult relations with the Rajapaksas when they were previously in power, primarily on account of human rights problems at the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The key question for the United States is now whether the two countries can reset their dialogue on the Indo-Pacific and regional peace and capitalize on the interests they share. The Rajapaksas are close to China, but any Sri Lankan government (as seen with the Sirisena government) would consider China a reliable friend and seek warm ties accordingly. Gotabaya Rajapaksa saw relatively little benefit in traditional peace-building policies when he was defense secretary, and he instead argued that economic development would solve the problems of ethnic relationships. There are deep concerns in Sri Lanka’s Tamil and Muslim communities that a Rajapaksa government will deal harshly with them. Disclosure: Ambassador Schaffer serves as a part-time advisor to McLarty Associates, as do I.
  • Sri Lanka
    Human Rights and the Sri Lankan Election
    Sri Lanka will hold its presidential election on November 16. In the decade since the end of its long-running internal conflict, lack of progress on human rights, reconciliation, and accountability has kept concern for these issues on the international agenda. I asked Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch, about the human rights issues at stake in this election. Our exchange appears below. The global human rights community has consistently called upon Sri Lanka to address reconciliation and accountability for the human rights and international humanitarian law violations during its thirty-year conflict. Where does that process stand today? There have been serious challenges to addressing wartime violations by both sides in Sri Lanka. Soon after the war ended in 2009, the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa was determined to deny all allegations of violations by security forces despite numerous findings by domestic and international groups, media, and the United Nations. There was some progress after Rajapaksa was defeated in the 2015 election. The new government under the current President Maithripala Sirisena agreed to a U.S.-led resolution at the UN Human Rights Council and pledged reform and justice. Unfortunately, after initial good steps including lifting the Rajapaksa government’s authoritarian stranglehold on dissent and the media, bolstering the national human rights commission, and setting up civil society-led public consultations on the need for accountability and constitutional reform, progress slowed down. The Office on Missing Persons took a long time to set up and has yet to resolve even a single case. The Office for Reparations too has made little headway. And key issues such as repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act and establishing a truth and reconciliation mechanism have just fallen off the radar. The worst is the rhetoric around setting up an independent justice mechanism with international participation—Sirisena simply reneged, saying that his government had no intention of prosecuting “war heroes.” What are the presidential candidates emphasizing, if anything, in their reconciliation and accountability agendas?  There are a number of candidates, but the contest is largely seen to be between Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Sajith Premadasa. Gotabaya, whose brother Mahinda was president during the final years of the war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was defense secretary at that time, and is widely alleged to have presided over conflict atrocities and the repression of peaceful critics. Premadasa’s father was also president, and was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber in 1993. In seeking to appeal to Sri Lanka’s Sinhala Buddhist majority, most politicians seem to think that calling for accountability, or even reconciliation among the country’s main ethnic and religious groups, will not win them votes. After the Easter Sunday bombings this year by Islamist groups that killed and injured hundreds—reminding many of similar past attacks by the LTTE—many Sri Lankans are seeking reassurances on security. Gotabaya Rajapaksa has not endorsed accountability for past rights abuses but emphasizes national security: “The security apparatus would be strengthened to secure the country from threats of terrorism, underworld activities, robbers, extortionists, drugs, violence and as well as foreign threats,” he recently said. Premadasa has sought the support of minority Tamil and Muslim communities who fear the return of an authoritarian Rajapaksa government, but has not put forward an accountability agenda. Human Rights Watch has highlighted how social media platforms in Sri Lanka have been used to amplify hate speech. Can you say more about this challenge, what should be done about it, and what progress has been made? Social media and WhatsApp have become popular platforms to share and inform public opinion. But they have also been used to promote misinformation and incite hatred against marginalized groups. Tech companies need to uphold standards in protecting against human rights harm. Of course, companies wish to make a profit, but they need to recognize a key flaw. Algorithms engineered to maximize user engagement for advertising revenue can end up amplifying societal outrage and polarization by rewarding inflammatory and partisan content that people are more likely to share. What are the stakes for U.S. interests, particularly on the values and human rights front, with this upcoming election? Since the end of the armed conflict in 2009, the United States has played an important part promoting human rights in Sri Lanka. It had a key role in building the consensus for the resolution on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council in 2015. Since the Trump administration completely withdrew from participation in the council, the United States has effectively removed itself from the most important international forum for promoting human rights in Sri Lanka. The United States, which has strategic concerns about China’s increasing footprint in the Indian Ocean, should recognize that promoting human rights, justice and accountability is crucial for ensuring that democracies which respect rights thrive in the region. Whoever wins the election, the United States should make human rights a priority of its foreign policy.
  • Uganda
    How Will China React to Uganda’s Looming Debt Crisis?
    Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and is a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. Uganda is heading toward a debt crisis. According to a senior official at the Bank of Uganda, unless the country is able to sustain a growth rate of at least 7 percent—which economic projections show Uganda will not do—the country will default on its payments. As is the case for many African countries, China is Uganda’s largest creditor, making up 39 percent of total debt this past fiscal year. If Uganda defaults, it is unclear how China will react. Will China flex its muscles and negotiate for the rights to Uganda’s sovereign assets like it did in Sri Lanka, or ease the debt pressure, by restructuring Uganda’s loans over a longer time period as it did in Ethiopia?   Generally speaking, foreign governments and international financial institutions are hesitant to make loans to Uganda. They remain skeptical that Uganda will be able to honor them—except, apparently, China. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni recently admitted that China is the only partner that would agree to lend Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya $3.5 billion to construct a series of railways and roads. In addition, China is financing a $4 billion oil pipeline, currently under construction, that will connect the western region of Uganda to the port in Tanga, Tanzania—giving the landlocked country access to the Indian Ocean. Many of China’s loans to Sub-Saharan Africa can be seen in the context of China’s belt and road initiative.  China has reacted differently to each country’s individual debt crisis. At one end of the spectrum, China allegedly uses its leverage to gain strategic and material concessions if a debtor country is unable to pay their debts, exemplified by Sri Lanka handing over control of the Hambantota Port to China for ninety-nine years. China's alleged practice of debt-trap diplomacy, as it has been dubbed, has been hotly debated, though there seems to be a consensus that their lending practices are problematic. At the other end, China works with governments to restructure loans over a longer time period—often forgiving past interest payments—as illustrated by China’s twenty-year-loan extension to Ethiopia.  Completed in 2010, the Hambantota port did not draw enough ships to make the operations economically feasible. By July 2015, Sri Lanka could not service its payments. Consequently, in order to avoid defaulting on its debt, the government relinquished control of the port to China for nearly a century. Uganda’s auditor general report warns that the conditions of their loans similarly threaten the country’s sovereign assets. If the economic predictions hold and the country defaults on its payments to China, Uganda’s infrastructure projects might face a similar fate.  Ethiopia faces a similar debt crisis, linked in large part to the Chinese-financed, $4 billion Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. Opened in January 2018, the railway intended to expand Ethiopia’s export market by connecting its capital to the sea via Djibouti. But Ethiopia is importing more than it is exporting via the railway, not generating the revenue needed to service its debt to China. In response, China renegotiated the terms of the loan with Ethiopia to extend the payments over a longer period of time.  Based on China’s approach to Ethiopia and the similarity of its infrastructure projects connecting Uganda to the sea, it is more likely that China will work with Uganda to extend the repayment terms of the loans. There is speculation that China sought control of the Hambantota port because it is strategically important. According to some analysts, the port should be thought of as part of a string of pearls—China’s plan to have a line of ports stretching from Beijing to the Persian Gulf. Viewed this way, the Hambantota port is of much more strategic significance to China than Ethiopia’s and Uganda’s railways. Finally, internal and external criticism of China's lending practices are likely to encourage a more constructive approach to debtor countries.
  • Sri Lanka
    Sri Lanka Bombings: What We Know
    A high level of coordination suggests the perpetrators had substantial expertise, possibly drawn from a foreign-based terrorist group.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Women Around the World: This Week
    Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering February 8 to February 20, was compiled with support from Alexandra Bro and Anne Connell.
  • Japan
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of September 18, 2015
    Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Sungtae “Jacky” Park, Ariella Rotenberg, Ayumi Teraoka, and Gabriel Walker look at the top stories in Asia this week. 1. Japan clashes over military bills. A heated brawl broke out in Japan’s upper house of parliament on Thursday over contentious legislation that signaled the most dramatic shift in Japanese military policy since the end of World War II. The package of eleven bills, which the lower house passed earlier this year under similarly contentious circumstances, will allow the Japanese military, known as the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), to fight overseas and defend allied nations. Although the SDF have participated in a number of noncombat United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world, its capacity otherwise has always been limited to the direct defense of Japan. Supporters of the bills argued that Japan needed to loosen restrictions on the SDF to counter increasingly militaristic nations like China and North Korea, while detractors believed that such a move would violate Japan’s pacifist constitution and entangle the country in foreign conflicts. The legislation, which recent media polls said a majority of voters opposed, had drawn tens of thousands of protesters outside the parliament building in Tokyo over the past few weeks. Opposition to the bills, which passed late on Friday night, was nearly guaranteed to fail given that Prime Minister Abe’s ruling bloc holds a majority in the upper house. 2. United Nations report details Sri Lankan war crimes. A report released by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights outlined the crimes committed during Sri Lanka’s twenty-six-year civil war and made suggestions for reconciliation. Both the government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are accused of atrocities including forced conscription by LTTE, and torture, unlawful killings, and disappearances by the Sri Lankan security forces. The war, which ended in 2009, resulted in an estimated one hundred thousand casualties. The report called for a special hybrid court composed of both international and local representatives, but the Sri Lankan government said that it would instead pursue an entirely domestic effort. Days before the report’s release, the government announced plans to establish a truth and reconciliation commission. The report, produced after six years of investigation, had initially been scheduled for release in March, but was delayed for six months to give the new government under President Maithripala Sirisena a chance to investigate the previous administration’s  failure to prosecute certain suspects despite international pressure. A spokesman for the Sri Lankan government said that the family of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa was not guaranteed protection from allegations of war crimes. 3. North Korea bolsters nukes and announces satellite launch. Just one week after satellite imagery showed activity at the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea, the country has declared that it is increasing the “quality and quantity” of its nuclear arsenal. Official remarks by the director of North Korea’s Atomic Energy Research Institute reiterated the country’s stance on nuclear weapons, underscoring that they are a direct result of the United States’ “hostile policy” toward the country. Previously, North Korea’s foreign ministry has stated that the weapons are measures for self-defense and not bargaining chips. Earlier in the week North Korea also suggested that it might launch a satellite on October 10 for scientific purposes—which many believe is a cover for a disguised ballistic missile test—and to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The launch, which is the latest in a number of failed attempts and one success, could scuttle inter-Korean family reunions also planned for next month. 4. Uighur trafficking ring blamed for Bangkok bombing. Thailand’s chief of police has linked the bombing of the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok to Chinese Uighur Muslims, declaring that the perpetrators struck to avenge Thailand’s forced repatriation of Uighurs to China and Thailand’s dismantling of a human smuggling ring. If true, the bombing that took the lives of twenty people, most of them ethnic Chinese tourists, would be the first Uighur terrorist attack outside China. The Thai government has gone to lengths to avoid naming the suspect and connecting the deadly attack with Chinese Uighurs until now, fearing that it would create friction with Chinese allies and possibly harm its tourism industry that depends heavily on visitors from Chinese. 5. Nepal approves constitution after seven years of deliberation. On Sunday, a new constitution approved by Nepal’s three major parties (the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal [Unified Marxist-Leninist]), and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal [Maoist]) will go into force, dividing Nepal into seven federal states and establishing Nepal as a secular state. The document is not without criticism, however: of the 598 members of the constituent assembly, ninety-one either voted against the constitution or abstained from the vote. Those that voted against the document insist that Nepal is a Hindu nation and therefore reject the secular nature of the constitution, while those that abstained believe the document does not give an adequate voice to Nepal’s minority groups, the Tharu and Madhesi ethnic communities. Failure to bring the dissenters and abstainers into the fold could threaten political stability; violent protests by Madhesi groups have already broken out in southern Nepal. The political transition process leading up to this constitution—the seventh since 1948—began in 2006 at the end of the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Bonus: Kissing eases allergies. Hajime Kimata, a medical doctor who specializes in allergology at a clinic in Osaka, Japan, shared this year’s Ig Nobel Prize in medicine for his 2003 research on kissing and allergies. The Ig Nobel Prize, which was created as a parody of the Nobel and first awarded in 1991, aims to “honor achievements that first make people laugh, and then make them think.” Dr. Kimata found that after thirty minutes of kissing while listening to soft music, his Japanese subjects, all non-habitual kissers who were allergic to dust mites or cedar pollen, displayed reduced reactions to those allergens. Although Dr. Kimata could not attend the awards ceremony, he communicated through a video message his hope that “kissing will bring not only love but also attenuation of allergic reaction.” Dr. Kimata joins a long list of celebrated Ig Nobel laureates from Japan, including individuals that studied the slipperiness of banana peels, the effects of opera on mouse heart-transplant patients, and the biochemical process by which onions make people cry.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of March 13, 2015
    Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. U.S. rebukes UK for joining Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The UK announced that it would become a founding member of the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), despite the urging of the United States. Washington has openly lobbied against the AIIB, influencing South Korea and Australia to eschew membership, but Britain’s decision opens the door for other Western countries to reconsider. One U.S. official warned of the UK’s “trend toward constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power,” while another expressed “concerns about whether the AIIB will meet [the] high standards [of the World Bank and the regional development banks], particularly related to governance, and environmental and social safeguards.” The United States fears that the AIIB will undermine the impact of these organizations and serve as an extension of Chinese soft power. 2. Modi mounts a charm offensive aimed at Indian Ocean island nations. Accompanied by the national security advisor and foreign secretary, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on a five-day visit to Seychelles, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka on Tuesday. Since taking office, Modi has prioritized India’s neighborhood in his foreign policy, partially in response to growing Chinese influence in the region. By shoring up economic and defense assistance, Modi hopes to revitalize India’s relations with the island nations. In Seychelles, India gifted the small island nation an aircraft, and Seychelles leased India an island to boost security ties. Modi commissioned the Barracuda in Mauritius, the first naval ship built by India for a foreign country, and inked a number of agreements. Modi also pledged to deepen cooperation with Sri Lanka, which includes plans to partner on an oil storage project. Modi is the first Indian prime minister to visit Sri Lanka in almost three decades. 3. Police and students clash in Myanmar. After a weeklong standoff, police in Myanmar beat and detained students, monks, and journalists protesting an education bill that they say stifles academic independence. Several hundred protesters had planned to walk ninety miles from Mandalay to Yangon, but were blocked by police who refused to allow them to hoist flags, sing songs, or travel in convoy. While reports suggest the students attempted to break through police lines, protest leaders rejected the suggestion that they instigated the violence. The violent scenes are a reminder of Myanmar’s authoritarian military past, from which the country began to emerge four years ago under a nominally civilian government. 4. Sri Lanka vows domestic inquiry into war crimes within a month. Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena announced that a domestic investigative committee will be established shortly to probe allegations of atrocities committed in the final stages of Sri Lanka’s twenty-six-year civil war. Dissatisfied with Sri Lanka’s efforts under former president Rajapaksa to examine its wartime abuses, the United Nations Human Right Council (UNHRC) attempted its own international inquiry into Sri Lanka’s wartime atrocities. A UNHRC report on Sri Lanka’s war crimes scheduled to be released earlier this month was postponed at the request of Sri Lanka until September, allowing time for President Sirisena’s to set up a domestic investigation. Sri Lanka continues to be insistent that international players remain outside of the investigative process, but is open to considering outside advice. 5. Chinese extremists from Xinjiang are joining the Islamic State, claim Chinese government officials. State officials in China have claimed that Chinese extremists from Xinjiang are going overseas to join the self-proclaimed Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. Officials claim that these extremists are abroad in order to train and return home to execute terror attacks in their own country. China’s westernmost province, Xinjiang, borders Pakistan and Afghanistan and is home to the Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uighurs. This region of China has long been a location of tension between the ethnic Uighur minority, and the majority Han Chinese. The state-sponsored Global Times claimed in December that three hundred Chinese are in Syria and Iraq to fight, though Beijing’s assertions of Uighur extremists taking up arms with the Islamic State are largely unproven. The Communist Party chief in Xinjiang, Zhang Chunxian, reported rising violence in the region, particularly in the context of a global violent extremist movements, and has vowed to crack down on extremist violence. BONUS: Bhutan, world’s worst soccer team, wins World Cup qualifying match. The 209th-ranked team defeated Sri Lanka in Colombo for its first victory since 2008; in between wins, Bhutan suffered eighteen defeats, including a 5-2 loss to Sri Lanka in 2013. Though Sri Lanka isn’t ranked too much higher at 174th, overconfidence contributed to the higher-seeded team’s downfall. The Bhutanese side still has work to do, however, as the two countries will meet again in Thimphu, the capital of Bhutan, on Tuesday for the second leg of the qualifier.
  • Global
    The World Next Week: March 5, 2015
    Podcast
    India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Sri Lanka; the UN reviews its mission in Libya; and the fiftieth anniversary of the arrival of U.S. combat troops is marked in Vietnam.
  • Politics and Government
    Sri Lanka’s Victory for Democracy
    In a stunning upset today, Sri Lanka’s Maithripala Sirisena defeated ten-year incumbent strongman President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Sirisena is a former member of President Rajapaksa’s cabinet who defected, with more than twenty other members of parliament, to lead an umbrella opposition coalition just two months ago. Rajapaksa conceded with the vote count still underway; at the time of his concession early on Friday morning, the election results posted showed a nearly 52 percent lead for Sirisena against almost 47 percent for Rajapaksa. The results represent a victory for Sri Lankan democracy, obviously—a last-minute motley coalition David defeated a seeming Goliath through little more than wits and the right message. But based on the promises Sirisena and the opposition coalition made during the campaign, the election outcome also suggests a coming rebalance of Sri Lanka’s external relationships as well as its approach to governance at home. *  *  * The opposition campaigned vigorously against corruption, accusing the Rajapaksa government of siphoning off funds for its own family and leading the country to a future of international isolation and economic insolvency. Based on Sirisena’s campaign manifesto, the first-order priority will clearly be anti-corruption probes, cancellation of suspected sweetheart deals, and a review of Sri Lanka’s foreign indebtedness—particularly to China, which has become a major provider of economic assistance and investment in recent years. The next priority of the Sirisena government will be good, or more specifically “compassionate” governance—seeking to restore balance to the responsibilities divided between parliament and the presidency, scaling back the accrued powers of the presidency, and tackling nepotism. The Sirisena government will also—if fulfilling campaign promises—focus on restoring Sri Lanka’s international image as well as strengthening its “cordial relations with India, China, Pakistan, and Japan” and other important Asian partners (Thailand, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea). The campaign manifesto specially commits to improving relations with India, “with an attitude that would be neither anti-Indian nor dependent.” Expect also, though the manifesto speaks only of taking a “humanitarian” approach to human rights questions, a less defiantly defensive approach to the difficult national questions of ethnic reconciliation, nearly five years after the end of a most brutal thirty-year conflict. That could mean faster implementation in letter and spirit of the hundreds of excellent and far-reaching recommendations provided by the domestic Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) released publicly in November 2011. Three manifesto commitments offer clues:    I will consolidate the right of all communities to develop and secure their culture, language and religion, while recognising the Sri Lankan identity. I will ensure that all communities will have due representation in government institutions. [p.25]    As a substantive response to allegations of human rights violations directed against Sri Lanka I will take action to promote humanitarian and environment-friendly attitudes both locally and internationally. [p.43]  I will…immediately [stop] the State media being used as a propaganda weapon of the ruling party….Maintenance of a free media will be ensured by stopping direct and indirect threats and intimidation against print and electronic media, their owners and media personnel as well as abductions by white vans and killings. [p.60]   Each of these promises directly responds to recommendations contained in the LLRC. *  *  * Sri Lanka’s ever-closer economic and growing relationship with China, the subject of the opposition’s considerable criticism and much international press coverage in recent years, cannot be separated from the country’s deteriorating relations with the many countries and UN bodies which have urged Sri Lanka to meet its obligations to its own citizens. Since the grim end in May 2009 to the country’s decades-long fight against the internationally-sanctioned terrorist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), many in Sri Lanka and around the world have been looking for the government to focus on “winning the peace” after having won the war. Part of that has been a call to accelerate the process of reconciliation with the Tamil minority, and a call to review and account for what happened at the very last stages of the war, including allegations of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, and violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The unique Panel of Experts report commissioned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in June 2010 to advise the UN secretary-general on the “modalities” of an accountability process in Sri Lanka contained numerous findings, with perhaps the most widely-cited statement that “a range of up to 40,000 civilian deaths” (p.41) could not be ruled out, against the government’s claim of zero civilian casualties. The Sri Lankan government always rejected the validity, mandate, and findings of the Panel of Experts, stating that it exceeded the secretary-general’s mandate and intruded on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. In a positive and important step, the Government of Sri Lanka commissioned its own domestic commission, the LLRC, in 2010 to rightly take testimony from victims and their families, and examine what happened at the end of the conflict. Many international human rights organizations dismissed this effort as insufficient as it focused on reconciliation and not accountability. The UN Panel of Experts report assessed it as “deeply flawed” for the same reason. However, the extensive 400-page report the LLRC released following their deliberations covered a surprisingly wide range of recommendations: from political reconciliation with the Tamil politicians of the northern and eastern provinces; election of provincial governments; resettling the internally displaced; tackling land title problems linked to decades of displacement and encroachments by LTTE terrorists, settlers, and security forces over three decades; freedom of the press; use of the Tamil language nationally; Tamil minority representation in government civilian and security forces; and other issues that cut to the heart of the cleavage between the country’s Sinhalese majority and its Tamil minority. The report also called for the government to implement the recommendations of past commissions of inquiry. That the Rajapaksa government dithered on implementation of these fine recommendations, ironic after insisting on the illegitimacy of international recommendations as violations of national sovereignty, led ultimately to the three UN Human Rights Council resolutions of 2012, 2013, and 2014. These resolutions were not condemnatory, but rather took note of the LLRC, urged faster process in its implementation, and urged the country to develop an accountability mechanism. It was only after UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay’s report in 2013, and apparent foot-dragging on the part of the Sri Lankan government in fulfilling the recommendations of their own LLRC, that the international process added a new element in 2014: a UNHRC investigation. Tensions between the Rajapaksa government and the many governments around the world supporting the resolutions intensified. In 2013, when Colombo hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, then-Indian Prime Minister Singh skipped the proceedings, as did Canada’s Stephen Harper and Mauritius’s prime minister; the UK’s David Cameron attended with a high-profile advance visit to the northern Tamil-majority Jaffna peninsula and a promised “tough message” for Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa actively sought and received solace from these perceived affronts to his leadership by looking east. Sri Lanka’s partnership with China deepened, with formal statements noting China’s “all weather” support for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, and the two countries’ condemnation of “the use of human rights as a device to interfere in the domestic affairs of a country.” During this same period, the economic relationship with China intensified: China provided ever-increasing financial support and infrastructure financing to Sri Lanka, from the port at Hambantota, hometown of the Rajapaksas, to an airport, a coal power plant, part of the Colombo port, and a planned “port city” project in Colombo, among others. These projects have increasingly come under scrutiny within Sri Lanka for their cost, the terms of repayment for what are said to be largely commercial loans (rather than ultra-low interest financing, or grants), and alleged scope of personal enrichment directly to the Rajapaksa family.   *  *  * Following these years of intensive global governmental and nongovernmental attention to Sri Lanka, one of the immediate lessons from the UN processes—whether Panel of Experts report or the UNHRC undertakings—appears to be how limited the toolbox remains for international institutions to try to enhance, influence, or bring about change when countries resist it, and can turn to alternative partners for whom rights are not an issue. Sri Lanka’s tilt toward China has occurred exactly as others were pushing Colombo to undertake actions it had many reasons to delay indefinitely. But the story doesn’t end there yet. Sirisena defeated Rajapaksa with a platform focused on ending corruption, restoring Sri Lanka’s image and its relations abroad, and renewing a “compassionate governance” in the country. The perception of the Chinese financing itself became part of the Rajapaksa regime’s weakness—the perception that Sri Lanka’s ruling family had not only mortgaged the country’s economic security but had enriched themselves. Sirisena’s manifesto speaks of a 90 percent pilfering, for example (p.8). (These are all allegations, not proven facts.) We can expect a Sirisena government to launch inquiries, and likely cancel the more than $1 billion contract with China to build a new port city, as promised by then-opposition leader Ranil Wickramasinghe, now prime minister, in mid-December. While the new Sri Lankan government is not looking to end its relations with China—after all, it is the second priority country listed in the election manifesto—it will be very difficult to mount anti-corruption investigations and unwind these sorts of contracts without introducing tension into Sri Lanka’s relations with China. Should the Sirisena government follow through on its promises to restore better governance and independence to institutions like the judiciary—clipped back by the Rajapaksa regime—and attend to the matters of its citizens on an equal basis, the issues of reconciliation on the island may find themselves righted in the process. It does appear unlikely that a Sirisena government would support an international accountability inquiry, not surprisingly, but he has promised a domestic inquiry. Depending on how that process moves, it may deliver more, with more at-home buy-in, than the international effort. A Sri Lankan government following through on such steps would no longer be as isolated as it has become from the many countries around the world for which human rights are an important part of their international commitments. While it’s still early days, Sirisena’s dramatic win today marks a big win for democracy. It may also mark a big win for the international liberal order in the medium term as well. His government deserves time and a chance to get things right. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa
  • China
    The Top Ten Stories in South Asia, 2014
    It was a busy news year in South Asia, with events that will have far-reaching consequences for the region. Between India’s historic election, a hard-won unity government in Afghanistan, and ongoing political turmoil in Pakistan combined with shocking terrorist attacks, South Asia made the front pages around the world for many different reasons. Like last year, I’ve tried to sift through the year’s developments and assess which will have lasting effects on the countries in the region and beyond. Herewith my personal selection of 2014’s most consequential stories in South Asia: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins single-party majority in India, Narendra Modi becomes prime minister: Every general election in India is the world’s largest, and the 2014 elections to India’s Lok Sabha (House of the People) broke previous records. More than 550 million citizens turned out to vote in a nine-phase election stretching across six weeks. Narendra Modi took campaigning to a new level, criss-crossing the country to campaign, even appearing as a hologram before crowds he could not reach in person to stump for economic growth and good governance. And the BJP triumphed, coming out of a decade in opposition to secure a single-party majority, a feat not seen in India in thirty years. Markets responded positively to the news of a clear political mandate, with the Bombay Stock Exchange index reaching a then-record high the day the results were announced. While Modi placed great emphasis on economic growth during the campaign, his government’s reform efforts once in office have been less dramatic than expected; observers are now looking to his first full-year budget, due in February. Following protracted disputes, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah agree on power-sharing unity government in Afghanistan: The 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan unfolded over a lengthy five months, with an April first round, a June runoff, and ongoing accusations of election tampering thereafter. Intensive U.S. diplomacy through September helped achieve a power-sharing agreement for a “unity government,” allowing the country to move forward at a delicate time with international forces in the process of drawing down—and questions about regional stability increasingly voiced. With major high-level visits, China further cements development, economic, and strategic ties with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka: 2014 was the year that the People’s Republic of China unveiled its Silk Route and Maritime Silk Route connectivity strategies for the larger Asia region, complete with maps and major bilateral visits with South Asian countries. India has long worried about Chinese “encirclement” through what some analysts have termed a “string of pearls” presence throughout South Asia; in 2014 senior official bilateral visits at the head of government/head of state level took place between China and Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh, plus a foreign minister-level visit to Nepal (a 2014 visit of Nepal’s prime minister to China for an expo did not involve a Beijing stop). Each of these visits resulted in substantial announcements of economic assistance especially focused on infrastructure development. China has become a major economic partner—in many cases the top trading partner and/or leading foreign investor—in much of South Asia. President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September began with economic optimism but quickly turned to tension after Chinese troops incurred across the undemarcated border with India. U.S. and NATO troops complete handover of security operations in Afghanistan, scaling back to supporting role: December 2014 marked the ceremonial end of NATO responsibility in Afghanistan, as well as the transition of U.S. troops to a “train and support” mission, with Afghan security forces now in the lead. The international troop presence will remain at around thirteen thousand in early 2015, with the drawdown to resume on its path to phasing down to a small assistance role by the end of 2016. At its peak in 2011, the international coalition troop presence in Afghanistan was 140,000. Many countries in the region fear that a rapid drawdown could result in regional instability, as in Iraq, if Taliban and other terrorist attacks increase. Pakistani civilian government squeezed between military and street mobs, another setback for democracy: Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, came to power in a 2013 election widely heralded as a triumph for Pakistani democracy: the first peaceful transfer of power from one civilian government to another. Yet a year later, Sharif found his government beset with problems—especially a months-long “sit-in” street protest led by Imran Khan and the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf party that derailed the government from accomplishing anything for 126 days. Khan demanded that the democratically elected government step down as he claimed its victory was due to poll rigging. (Note: Khan called off his sit-in following the Taliban attack on a school in Peshawar in December.) Indian economy begins to pick up, regains “stable” rating, institutional investors return to India: During the last three years of India’s previous government, the country’s once-bright investment story lost its luster due to numerous corruption scandals and a more difficult investment environment. In 2012, Standard & Poor’s lowered its outlook on India to “negative.” Since India’s credit rating was already at BBB-, the lowest investment grade, a negative outlook put India at risk for downgrade to junk status. Prime Minister Modi, elected this year on a mandate for growth, made pitching for foreign investment among his top foreign policy priorities. Institutional investors came back quickly, pleased with the outlook for doing business, and India regained a “stable” outlook for its credit rating. Economic growth ticked up to 5.6 percent (from 5.0 percent in 2013), with both the IMF and World Bank forecasting growth over 6 percent in 2015. With a $2 trillion economy, India is the region’s economic engine. Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina reelected to five-year term in Bangladesh in low-turnout election: Following months of street violence and threats by the opposition party Bangladesh National Party (BNP) to boycott the national elections in Bangladesh should a caretaker government not oversee the process, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina went ahead with elections on January 5. Half the seats were uncontested, due to the BNP’s boycott, and the ruling Awami League was reelected handily amid violence that killed eighteen. Official figures put voter turnout at 40 percent, but press reports suggested lower turnout of some 20 to 30 percent. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit convenes after three-year delay, passes important agreement on regional energy: The regional association covering the least-integrated region in the world, SAARC, has long been troubled by the difficult relationship between India and Pakistan, which has prevented the association from accomplishing anything significant in trade and interconnectivity. Making matters worse, the host country responsible for the summit in 2012—Nepal—failed to pull together a meeting in 2012 (and again in 2013) due to its own internal political troubles. That said, once the gathering convened in November 2014, it actually managed to result in an agreement on regional energy signed by all eight countries. Agreements on regional rail connectivity and motor vehicles, however, were not concluded when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the sole hold out, declined to sign. Taliban attack school in Peshawar, more than 130 children murdered: On December 16, Taliban terrorists attacked children attending a military school in Peshawar. As Pakistan and the rest of the world came to learn of the horrors unleashed on innocent schoolchildren—and as the Pakistani Taliban came forward to claim responsibility for the attack, termed a “reprisal” for military attacks on the Taliban—the gravity of Pakistan’s uncontrolled terrorism problem began to sink in. A public debate has resumed within Pakistan about the country’s direction, and its relationship to the Taliban, while arrests of the December 16 perpetrators are underway. Nearly simultaneously, a Pakistani court granted bail to one of the Mumbai attack planners, a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist, leading some leading experts to question whether the Peshawar attack would result in any change after all, or whether it would be business as usual, as usual. Sri Lankan president calls early election, surprise defection creates viable opposition candidate: Sri Lanka’s strongman president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, has handily won election twice, and his current term runs through 2016. In November, he invoked a provision in the Sri Lankan constitution that allows for early elections, which could theoretically allow him to secure a mandate through to 2022. Yet in a surprise development, an opposition candidate emerged when Maithripala Sirisena defected from Rajapaksa’s own party (as well as his cabinet) to energize and lead an umbrella opposition coalition. Sirisena appears to be attracting more support, with additional members of parliament leaving Rajapaksa for Sirisena. Rajapaksa is embattled internationally, with successive UN Human Rights Council resolutions raising questions about his government’s responsibility for human rights and humanitarian law violations at the end of the country’s civil war in 2009. His increasingly centralized management of Sri Lanka has also raised questions domestically about authoritarianism. The election has been set for January 8, 2015. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa  
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of October 31, 2014
    Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Andrew Hill, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Vietnam and India strengthen defense and energy ties amid territorial disputes with China. The two nations signed a number of agreements following a meeting this week between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Most notably, Vietnam agreed to further open its oil and gas sector to India, while India agreed to provide Vietnam with four off-shore patrol vessels. Prior to his two-day state visit, Dung called for a larger Indian role in the South China Sea, in spite of criticism from China. Both Hanoi and New Delhi are embroiled in territorial disputes with Beijing: Vietnam in the South China Sea and India along the Himalayas. 2. Mudslide devastates Sri Lanka. After an onslaught of rain, a deadly mudslide wrecked a tea plantation a little over one hundred miles east of Colombo. Search operations for missing victims have been complicated by daunting weather and the absence of village records, which were buried in the avalanche. Around 120 homes were swept away and nearly two hundred people are feared to be dead, and hundreds of people have been evacuated from the area to overcrowded camps. Although the chances of finding survivors are slim, Sri Lanka has dispatched army soldiers, air force troops, policemen, and health and civic teams to aid rescue and relief efforts. 3. Retired Chinese general confesses to taking enormous bribes. After a seven-month investigation, Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a former member of the Politburo, will be charged with bribery  after admitting to “extremely large” amounts of bribes through family members to help others gain promotion. Court martialed in June, Xu was was stripped of his military titles and expelled from the Communist Party. Beijing has touted the move as evidence of its commitment to President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign; former security chief Zhou Yongkang is expected to be the next high-level official to face corruption charges. 4. Singapore upholds law criminalizing gay sex. Singapore’s highest court ruled that a seventy-six-year old law criminalizing sex between men is in line with the city-state’s constitution, rejecting multiple appeals that the measure infringes upon human rights. The law prescribes a jail term of up to two years for men who publicly or privately engage in any act of “gross indecency.” At a time when support for same-sex marriage is increasing in the West, gay rights advocates across Asia are still struggling to secure protections. Brunei, for instance, has instituted strict laws that criminalize gay relationships; a British colonial-era law in India that criminalizes gay sex was reinstated by the supreme court last year; in Indonesia’s Aceh province, gay sex is punished with one hundred lashes. Progress for greater LGBT rights can be seen in New Zealand—the only Asia-Pacific country to legalize gay marriage—and Taiwan, where the annual pride march recently took over the streets of Taipei. 5. China, South Korea urge North Korea on denuclearization. Following a Sino-South Korean meeting in Beijing on Wednesday, chief nuclear envoys Hwang Joon-kook (South Korea) and Wu Dawei (China) expressed concern over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and discussed how to reopen the stalled Six Party Talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has been more vocal in its censure of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Earlier this week in Seoul, Sydney Seiler, U.S. special envoy for Six Party talks, reiterated the U.S. position that North Korea must demonstrate its commitment to halting the development of its nuclear program before the United States would be willing to resume the Six Party Talks. Bonus: Halloween causes controversy around Asia. Malaysia’s highest Islamic body, the National Fatwa Council, announced that Muslims should not celebrate Halloween, calling it a Christian celebration of the dead and “against Islamic teachings.” The council instead advised Muslims to remember the dead by reciting prayers and reading the Quran. The council also ruled that touching dogs is un-Islamic and condemned a dog-petting festival earlier this month. In unrelated news, Beijing banned Halloween costumes from its subways, afraid that they might cause “panic” or “stampedes.”
  • India
    The Indian Elections and Indian Foreign Policy: What Tamil Nadu Parties Have to Say
    This post is part of a series on the Indian elections.  Campaigning for India’s national elections is in full swing. Parties have begun nominating candidates and 543 races for the lower house of parliament are on. But despite the election fever pitch, the two major national parties—the ruling Congress Party and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party—have not yet released their election platforms, or “manifestos,” as they are called. This leaves voters and observers playing a parlor guessing game on the domestic and foreign policy priorities each will formally prioritize. This year’s manifesto writing process even has a new crowdsourcing twist: Both Congress and BJP are accepting suggestions on the web. There’s one major state in India, however, where parties have already released their manifestos: Tamil Nadu. Both the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) have released their documents. And both have some specific positions on India’s policy toward neighboring Sri Lanka. Of course, there’s much history here. In the past two years, Tamil Nadu’s politicians of all stripes called for India to support U.S.-sponsored resolutions on reconciliation in Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. India typically stays away from single-country resolutions, and relations with such a close neighbor are sensitive and important for India’s national security. The resolutions sparked an intense domestic debate, raising tough questions like whether it was in India’s interest to alienate Colombo by voting against it. Sri Lanka has a strong and growing relationship with China, a fact lost on no one. On the other hand, given India’s example of democracy amidst great diversity and seventy million-strong Tamil population, many argued that India’s greater interests lay in calling for devolution of power in Sri Lanka and full implementation of the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution to that end, and the empowerment of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority. This is the “rights versus realism” tension. A harder issue for India was whether to support the resolution’s request for the Sri Lankan government to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law during the end of the long-running conflict there in 2009. India ended up voting for the resolutions in both 2012 and 2013. Even so, last year the Congress-led coalition government lost a major Tamil coalition ally, the DMK, which walked out of the government days prior to the vote in Geneva, stating that the Indian government should have pushed for tougher resolution language. This year’s resolution, introduced by the United States with several co-sponsors, takes things a step further by endorsing a call by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for an international mechanism to investigate allegations of abuses in Sri Lanka. The current program of work for the UN Human Rights Council has a discussion on Sri Lanka scheduled for March 26. The Indian government has said little publicly about the Sri Lanka resolution so far. But the AIADMK suffers from no such reticence. Its official manifesto explicitly pledges support for Sri Lankan Tamils: The AIADMK is determined to ensure that punishment is given through the International Court of Justice to all those who committed war crimes and genocide against the Tamil minorities during the internal strife in Sri Lanka, which was against international regulations. The AIADMK is also determined to move the United Nations to take action and render justice to the Tamils in Sri Lanka and for holding a Referendum amongst Tamils in Sri Lanka and displaced Sri Lankan Tamils across the world for formation of a separate Eelam. This pledge goes much, much farther than any of the UN Human Rights Council resolutions, first by calling for punishment through the International Court of Justice prior to any international investigation, but second and most importantly, by explicitly calling for a referendum for the formation of a separate Eelam, or separate Tamil homeland in the north of Sri Lanka. Every international effort to date has called for political settlement and progress on reconciliation on the island but within the framework of a unified Sri Lanka. File photo: Chief of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party M. Karunanidhi (sitting) and his wife Dayalu Ammal (L) (Babu Babu/Courtesy Reuters). The DMK’s manifesto has a slightly different perspective. First, it calls for the central government to “appoint only qualified Tamils as envoys to the nations in which Tamils live in considerable number.” Second, it specifically references the Human Rights Council resolution, and notes that Tamil organizations have been calling for an independent (not domestic) investigation into allegations of rights abuses, and says that “the DMK will continue to persuade India to urge countries of the world to undertake an independent international probe into human rights violations, war crimes, and genocide in Sri Lanka.” It then urges: …immediate action for conducting a referendum under the supervision of the UNO among Tamils in Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and migrated Eelam Tamils to choose a permanent political solution of their choice and as interim relief press the Lankan regime to implement the provisions of the 13th Consitutional amendment to get full powers for fulfilling the aspirations of Tamils. So the DMK stops short of explicitly calling for a separate homeland, leaving open the question of how best Sri Lanka’s Tamils should gain a measure of political autonomy. Individual political parties do not unilaterally determine India’s foreign policy, and the perspective of one state does not override national considerations. But it will be interesting to see whether either the AIADMK or the DMK end up joining a coalition to form the government come mid-May, and how their positions will have an impact on India’s foreign policy. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa