Can Biden’s New Asylum Policy Help Solve the Migrant Crisis?

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Can Biden’s New Asylum Policy Help Solve the Migrant Crisis?

The Biden administration’s proposed immigration policy aims to curb migrant flows to the United States amid record border crossings. What will it do, and how does it compare to the Trump years?

In February 2023, President Joe Biden unveiled a new asylum policy that aims to discourage unauthorized border crossings into the United States. His administration says the measure is necessary to handle a growing number of border crossings, but critics say it could have deadly consequences for migrants who have a legal right to seek protection.

What is the Biden administration’s new asylum policy?

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Under the new rule, border authorities will deny asylum to most migrants who arrive at an official port of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border without having first applied for asylum in a third country traversed along the way. Migrants who do not schedule an appointment at a point of entry or use other available humanitarian programs will be deported to their home countries. 

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The policy will include exemptions for people with medical emergencies, children traveling alone, and Mexican nationals. (About 11 percent of all pending asylum cases in 2022 were for Mexican citizens.) The measure is expected to take effect in May when Title 42, a policy that denies asylum on pandemic-related grounds, is set to end. Immigration experts say the proposal is likely to be challenged in court.

President Joe Biden speaks with officials at the U.S.-Mexico border in El Paso, Texas.
President Joe Biden speaks with officials at the U.S.-Mexico border in El Paso, Texas. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

What problem does it aim to address?

Biden took office pledging to reform the U.S. immigration system and restore asylum access that had been curtailed under his predecessor, President Donald Trump. However, a growing influx of migrants crossing the border has upended those plans. Illegal border crossings surpassed 2.3 million in fiscal year 2022, an all-time high, while the backlog of asylum cases pending in U.S. immigration courts currently sits at more than 820,000, the most on record. The Biden administration hopes that redirecting that flow to official ports of entry will overcome the public perception of chaos at the border.

U.S. officials say that, absent any policy changes, migration at the border is likely to surge after Title 42 is lifted in May, with illegal border crossings reaching as much as thirteen thousand per day. More than 2.6 million migrants have been deported under Title 42, and efforts to terminate it have been repeatedly delayed by multiple ongoing lawsuits from Republican-led states.

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How does it compare to Trump’s approach to asylum policy?

Trump took several steps to significantly reshape asylum and border policy. These included deferring asylum applications [PDF], a tactic known as “metering”; enforcing the so-called transit ban [PDF] that denied asylum to most migrants at the southern border (though it was later struck down in court); and launching the Migrant Protection Protocols, also known as the “Remain in Mexico” program, which required migrants to wait in Mexico while their immigration cases were processed in U.S. courts. Additionally, Trump and several Central American nations negotiated “safe third country” agreements, which sought to force asylum seekers who traveled through those countries to return to them. However, only the agreement with Guatemala was implemented, though it was later terminated in 2021.

While Biden’s proposal similarly restricts the number of asylum seekers who can seek protection in the United States, officials have rejected comparisons to the Trump administration’s attempts at a near-total asylum ban. They insist that the new policy allows for various exemptions on humanitarian grounds and that the administration has made alternative legal pathways available, including humanitarian parole for citizens of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. They also characterize the two-year order as an emergency measure that is designed to be temporary.

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What are the criticisms?

Critics, including civil and human rights groups and some high-ranking Democrat lawmakers, argue that the policy endangers the lives of migrants who cannot wait for their asylum applications to be processed due to unsafe conditions in their home country. They say it undermines U.S. immigration law, which guarantees migrants the right to seek asylum in the United States if they fear persecution at home. “This policy will effectively prohibit most asylum seekers from exercising their right to seek safety in the U.S., and will force many vulnerable people to remain in situations that could endanger their lives,” Mark Hetfield, president and CEO of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), said in a statement.

Many opponents also argue that the exceptions are too narrow and that the alternative pathways are likely to be insufficient, including the untested mobile app made for this purpose. This could lead many applicants to be presumed ineligible unless they can prove they were refused refuge in another country, potentially a tall order. Some Democrats in Congress have instead called for expanding asylum availability.

Republican lawmakers, meanwhile, have criticized Biden’s handling of the border and threatened to impeach Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. However, the newly Republican-controlled House of Representatives is facing its own internal divisions over asylum restrictions proposed by Republicans

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.