Canada’s 2025 Elections: Why the U.S. Is on the Ballot

In Brief

Canada’s 2025 Elections: Why the U.S. Is on the Ballot

Canadians are heading to the polls at the most fraught moment in U.S.-Canada relations in eighty years.

After being sworn in as prime minister last month, Mark Carney called a general election for April 28, stating that Canada’s leader needed a strong mandate to address the challenges posed by the Donald Trump administration. Although the Conservative Party had long been expected to return to power, the Liberal Party has experienced a historic surge in support since Carney took office, marking the largest polling increase in the country’s history.

How did the U.S.-Canada relationship come to dominate this election?

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The return of President Trump has dramatically reshaped Canada’s electoral landscape. Historically, the U.S.-Canada relationship has been defined by strong security, economic, and cultural ties. The two countries share a 5,525-mile frontier—the longest undefended border in the world—and the two NATO allies also cooperate through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the only binational military command in existence. Canada is also the United States’ largest export market, and the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA) has further deepened North American supply chain integration. 

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However, Trump’s return to the White House has brought renewed tensions. His administration has openly targeted Canada, with the president repeatedly suggesting the country could become the “fifty-first state.” Trump has accused Canada, as well as Mexico, of failing to do enough to stop illegal migration and fentanyl trafficking despite the fact that neither is a significant issue at the U.S.-Canada border. This rhetoric has sparked a trade war and ignited a wave of patriotism across Canada, prompting politicians and citizens alike to rally in defense of national sovereignty and call for boycotts of American goods. Canadian car travel to the United States already dropped by 32 percent in March compared to the previous year.

Who are the parties and political figures to watch?

Liberal Party. Last fall, longtime Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his party appeared headed for certain defeat. Trudeau struggled to maintain his minority coalition after the progressive New Democrat Party withdrew from its supply-and-confidence agreement, and he faced down three no-confidence votes. In December, Trudeau announced he would step down after nine years in power. His successor, Mark Carney, is a relative newcomer to Canadian politics and previously served as governor of both the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England. Carney’s handling of Trump’s threats has garnered widespread support.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney makes a campaign stop in Hamilton, Ontario.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney makes a campaign stop in Hamilton, Ontario. Carlos Osorio/Reuters

*Conservative Party. Pierre Poilievre has led Canada’s Conservative Party since 2022. A career politician, Poilievre has struggled to adapt to the new political dynamic. Once positioning himself as Canada’s answer to Trump with a “Canada First” message, he now faces voters who appear increasingly unreceptive to his populist rhetoric.

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What is the state of Canada’s trade war with the United States?

After multiple rounds of threats and negotiations, Trump announced 25 percent tariffs on all goods not covered under the USMCA (which will primarily affect Canadian agricultural goods) and 10 percent tariffs on energy products. Although nearly all of Canada’s exports are USMCA-compliant, this executive order will complicate trade by requiring producers to complete additional paperwork.

Trump’s Section 232 tariffs on foreign aluminum and steel will harm Canada as the United States’ largest supplier of both metals; the tariffs are not covered by the USMCA because they were invoked on national security grounds. He has also employed Section 232 to impose a 25 percent tariff on Canadian cars and auto components. Cars are Canada’s second-largest export to the United States and the two countries’ auto industries are deeply integrated. The measure is already threatening Canadian jobs: on the day of Trump’s April 2 tariff announcement, multinational automaker Stellantis paused production of Chevrolet and Dodge cars in Windsor, Ontario, until the week of April 21.

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In response, Carney has imposed a retaliatory 25 percent tariff on imports of U.S. cars and trucks and announced that Canada would convene a coalition of like-minded nations to form a new global trading order. He declared that Canada’s “old relationship” with the United States was now over.

What other issues are at play in the election?

Aside from Canada’s relations with the United States, voters are concerned about the cost of living, immigration, and foreign interference.

Cost of living. Canada is facing a cost-of-living crisis and a major housing shortage. Inflation has risen by 14 percent since the last parliamentary election in 2021. In urban metro areas such as Toronto, the average home costs ten times the annual income of the average household.

Immigration. Although Canadian attitudes toward newcomers have traditionally been welcoming, there is now a consensus that the immigration rates of the last few years have strained public services and the housing supply. Recognizing changing public sentiment, Trudeau announced he was cutting the annual number of permanent residents by 21 percent in 2025.

Foreign interference. Over the past five years, Canadian politics has been rocked by allegations of foreign interference from both China and India. The Chinese government was first accused of covertly influencing elections in Ontario in favor of the Liberal Party—a scandal for which the Liberals have faced ongoing criticism over its handling. Conversely, India has been accused of attempting to interfere in support of Conservative candidates. 

*Correction: A previous version of this article referred to the Conservative Party as the Progressive Conservative Party.

Will Merrow created the graphics for this In Brief.

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