Could a U.S.-Iran Deal Lead to a Nuclear Thaw?

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Could a U.S.-Iran Deal Lead to a Nuclear Thaw?

News of Iran’s upcoming release of U.S. nationals and the unfreezing of Iranian assets has stirred speculation of a new nuclear deal. But there are many obstacles to such a breakthrough.

The United States and Iran are negotiating a prisoner swap that involves the release of billions of dollars in Iranian assets, and now reports indicate Iran is slowing the pace at which it is enriching uranium. What’s going on? 

There is reporting that the United States and Iran have concluded a deal regarding the exchange of five dual citizens imprisoned in Iran—who were recently transferred to house arrest—for $6 billion of Iranian funds frozen in South Korea. News reports have also indicated that an unspecified number of Iranian citizens imprisoned in the United States could be on the exchange list. While the deal has been widely publicized, the transaction has not been concluded. It is not clear what the remaining obstacles are. For the past few months, the two sides have been holding indirect talks, brokered by Oman, over both the prisoner swap and possible revisions to the 2015 nuclear deal.

What are the prospects for a new, informal U.S.-Iran agreement freezing or limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions at least for a few years?

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The United States left the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. For the next year, Iranian authorities remained committed to their obligations, but then they gradually began to scale up both nuclear-power capacity and production. Among the provocative moves that Iran has made is enriching uranium up to 60 percent purity, close to weapons grade. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest quarterly report to member states said that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity grew again during this last quarter, but far slower than in the previous quarter.

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The Iranian foreign minister recently suggested that the two sides are working on the text of amendments to the original Iran deal, but thus far, no confirmation of such efforts has been given. It is often hard to credit reports coming out of Tehran of progress in nuclear talks. In recent years, it has hinted at progress that has not come about.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have moved to normalize relations this year. Is there any connection between that and Iran’s other diplomatic moves?

The key actor in the Iran-Saudi Arabia deal was China. Iranian and Saudi officials had been negotiating for a long time under the auspices of Iraq, but those talks failed to produce an agreement. As the largest purchaser of Saudi oil, China seeks to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, and it was concerned about a potential clash between the two Gulf states.

Iran’s pragmatism in the Gulf is not yet apparent in other parts of the Middle East. It continues to assist various militias in Iraq and Syria and remains hostile to Israel. The agreements normalizing relations between Israel and multiple Arab states in the past few years have also caused considerable consternation in Tehran.

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What should we look for in Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s upcoming visit to New York and address to the UN General Assembly?

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi addresses the UN General Assembly in September 2022.
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi addresses the UN General Assembly in September 2022. Brendan McDermid/Reuters

President Raisi has not distinguished himself during his tenure as an activist president in command of the national agenda. He seems to be more of a passive actor with limited imagination and is rarely capable of taking initiative. His speech at the United Nations is likely to echo his previous comments at international forums, such as his 2022 General Assembly address that railed against Western sanctions on Iran. In a recent press conference he said, “Some find solutions in the smiles of America and a few European countries…But we do not wait for those smiles and do not hinge public livelihood upon the will of those states.” He will be uncompromising, even strident.

There is a lot of diplomatic noise around the Iran issue today in the region, the United States, and beyond, and Raisi and Iranian foreign ministry officials will hold their share of meetings in New York. It is unlikely that these will be in person with the American side, although the Iranians could have discussions with their European counterparts.

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China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.