Ukraine Should Wait on Cease-Fire Talks With Russia. Here’s Why.

In Brief

Ukraine Should Wait on Cease-Fire Talks With Russia. Here’s Why.

Ukraine has rejected recent calls by the West for it to settle its war with Russia. Ukrainian leaders believe they have a chance to reclaim territory lost in the early fighting—and that they can do so before serious negotiations begin.

Several European leaders and prominent Western commentators have called for a cease-fire in Ukraine, but without success. Ukrainian leaders have reason to hope they can continue to repel Russian forces, and pushing for a settlement now could foreclose military gains, undermine Western unity, and strengthen Russian President Vladimir Putin’s resolve.

Given the death and destruction that Russia’s invasion has caused, why are Ukrainian officials resisting calls for a cease-fire?

More From Our Experts

The first reason is obvious from a look at the map: Russia occupies much of Ukraine. Yes, Russia’s armed forces have suffered some major setbacks, which some analysts—including my CFR colleague Charles Kupchan—have described as a strategic defeat. But the territory Russia has seized is roughly four times larger than the two separatist regions it controlled in eastern Ukraine when the war started. To Ukrainians, that’s not a defeat for Putin; it’s a victory that has to be undone. They believe that, with the right support from the West, they have a shot at reversing their early losses. That hope is the second reason they don’t want a cease-fire now. As more and better military equipment flows to their forces, they see an opportunity to turn the tide against the Russians.

At what point would it make sense for the United States to call for a compromise?

More on:

Ukraine

The War in Ukraine

Russia

United States

Diplomacy and International Institutions

If Ukrainian forces push the Russians back to the pre-invasion lines of February 23, or even close to them, that would be a genuine strategic defeat for Putin. It would automatically start a serious conversation between Ukrainian and Western leaders about whether and how to translate success on the ground into success at the negotiating table. Both Washington and Kyiv know this; no anguished New York Times editorials would be needed to start the discussion.  

As for Russian forces, if the next phase of the war goes badly for them, they’ll be calling for talks themselves. The signal that Putin is serious about negotiations is when he stops accusing Ukraine and the West of staging atrocities, such as those at Bucha, to thwart diplomacy. Until then, talking about all the painful compromises Ukraine will have to make for peace will only divide a country that the United States has every reason to help.

What about the fear that the Russians will use nuclear weapons?

No one can completely dismiss the risk that Putin will use nuclear weapons—not after all the bizarre things he has said and done of late. But there are also reasons not to overstate that risk or be paralyzed by it. Though Putin makes mistakes, he doesn’t seem suicidal. (To the contrary, those long conference tables suggest extreme caution.) And as deferential as his generals have been to all his wild ideas, they’re not suicidal either. Fear of nuclear conflict might be the one thing that could lead them to resist a presidential order. It’s the job of the president of the United States to reinforce their hesitations and to make warnings about the consequence of using nuclear weapons as vivid and credible as possible.

More From Our Experts

Wouldn’t an early settlement facilitate a better postwar relationship between the West and Moscow?

Managing relations with Russia will be an immense policy challenge no matter how—or how soon—the war ends. There is no easy path back to a cooperative relationship, not even a narrow, transactional one. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov admits as much. He recently said Russia was at an historic turning point, like 1917 or 1991. (For a senior Russian official, there is no more dire way to describe the moment than to compare it to these two cases of regime collapse.)

Great skill and imagination will be needed to forge a new relationship, which won’t endure unless it rests on some measure of common interest. But the United States can’t dodge this upheaval, or smooth the transition, simply by deciding that it wants to work with Russia on climate change or any other pressing challenge. Among all the global players whose cooperation is needed to solve such problems, Russia doesn’t rank very high.

More on:

Ukraine

The War in Ukraine

Russia

United States

Diplomacy and International Institutions

Proponents of an early end to the war often express doubt about Western unity. Is that another reason to push Ukraine to compromise?

Both Russia and Ukraine are watching the unity of the Western alliance very closely. It’s one reason Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has put so much effort into courting European publics. Putin, meanwhile, is counting on division within the West to simplify his policy choices. He likely tells himself that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have overreached, and that European consumers won’t stand for the higher food and energy costs that sanctions and the war impose on them.

If this is Putin’s hope, it will surely make him even less likely to show any flexibility in negotiations. To succeed, Western policy has to disabuse him of this hope. European leaders who want Russia to call the war off on terms that they—not to mention Ukraine—can accept first have to persuade Putin that Western unity will hold. Only when Putin stops counting on disunity will he start looking for an exit strategy.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Europe

On the eighty-first anniversary of D-Day, CFR President Michael Froman and senior fellows discuss the Trump administration’s diminished appetite for engagement in European security affairs—even as the Russia-Ukraine war drags on.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.