U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?

In Brief

U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?

The Trump administration has made bold gestures in support of Taiwan, including more frequent movement of U.S. ships in the Taiwan Strait. They come at a time of growing anxiety about the U.S.-China relationship.

For three months in a row this year, U.S. military ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait, seen as a show of support for Taipei and a challenge to Beijing. They are just one aspect of Trump administration’s backing for Taiwan, and combined with China’s more aggressive approach to the democratic island, many analysts fear a cross-strait crisis.

Trump Is Raising the Stakes

More From Our Experts

In the past nine months, U.S. ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait six times. During the Obama administration, passages were far less frequent, at just one to three times per year. Even though the Taiwan Strait is an international waterway, China is sensitive to the U.S. military’s presence and considers any transits of U.S. ships through the strait “provocative actions.”

More on:

Taiwan

China

Defense and Security

Military Operations

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is said to be encouraging Taipei to purchase dozens of F-16s, a sale that, like other major arms deals, would require congressional approval. The last time the United States sold these fighter jets to Taiwan was 1992. If the sale goes through, it would mark another departure from the Obama administration, which declined to sell the jets to avoid escalating tensions with Beijing. But experts say a sale would be put on hold until after the United States seals a trade deal with China.

A map showing Taiwan, China, and the Taiwan Strait.

Aside from military contacts, President Donald J. Trump has bolstered Taiwan through other measures. After the 2016 election, for example, he talked to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on the phone in what was believed to be the first time a U.S. president or president-elect spoke directly with a Taiwanese leader since at least 1979. In 2018, the United States unveiled $250 million worth of upgrades to a de facto embassy in Taipei despite Chinese objections.

More From Our Experts

Yet U.S. Arms Sales Flat

While the Trump administration is taking more assertive steps than those of his predecessors, its arms sales to Taiwan are thus far nothing remarkable.

The United States has sold military equipment to Taiwan since 1979. That year, as President Jimmy Carter severed formal diplomatic ties with the island and formally recognized China, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the basis for Washington’s relationship with Taipei and includes the provision of arms for Taiwan’s self-defense. The law does not require the United States to defend Taiwan if China attacks, but it also doesn’t rule it out—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.

More on:

Taiwan

China

Defense and Security

Military Operations

A chart showing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 2001.

Since then, the United States has followed through on its commitment to support the island’s defenses, with Taiwan ranking as one of the top importers of U.S. arms [PDF] in recent years. During his first term, President Barack Obama signed off on two major packages, totaling about $12 billion [PDF]. President George W. Bush approved nine arms packages, worth approximately $5 billion, during his first term.

Trump has announced two major military sales to Taiwan. The first, approved in June 2017, was worth $1.4 billion and included advanced missiles and torpedoes. It also provided technical support for an early-warning radar system. In October 2018, a second arms package, worth an estimated $330 million, was approved.

A Cross-Strait Crisis Looming?

The clouds over Taiwan have grown darker in recent months. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping said Taiwan must be unified with the mainland and urged Taipei to embrace the 1992 Consensus. It states that there is only “one China” and Taiwan belongs to it but allows different interpretations of which is the governing entity. China “will not rule out the use of force” against foreign intervention, Xi said. Tsai reiterated that her government will never accept the “one country, two systems” model and defended the democratic island’s sovereignty.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen waves on the deck of a warship purchased from the United States.
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen waves on the deck of a warship purchased from the United States. Chris Stowers/AFP/Getty Images

The worrisome China-Taiwan tensions come as the U.S.-China relationship has deteriorated, with the two rivals engaged in major disputes over trade and technology and jostling for power in the western Pacific. During this week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meetings in Washington, threats from China reportedly featured more prominently than ever before.

Experts say all of these factors are increasing the risk of a cross-strait crisis. “The status quo is admittedly imperfect,” wrote CFR President Richard N. Haass, “but it is far less imperfect than what would follow unilateral actions and attempts to resolve a situation that doesn’t lend itself to a neat solution.”

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Europe

On the eighty-first anniversary of D-Day, CFR President Michael Froman and senior fellows discuss the Trump administration’s diminished appetite for engagement in European security affairs—even as the Russia-Ukraine war drags on.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.