Batteries Not Included

The world is moving toward electric vehicles and clean energy, but a green future doesn’t depend on wind turbines, solar panels, and Teslas alone. It will also require a vast supply of advanced batteries. As a result, global demand for lithium—an essential battery ingredient—is outpacing supply, with the gap expected to grow in the years to come.

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Host
  • Gabrielle Sierra
    Director, Podcasting
Credits

Asher Ross - Supervising Producer

Markus Zakaria - Audio Producer and Sound Designer

Rafaela Siewert - Associate Podcast Producer

Episode Guests
  • Frank Fannon
    Managing Director, Fannon Global Advisors
  • Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran
    Global Energy & Climate Innovation Editor, The Economist

Show Notes

Lithium is a lightweight metal used in most rechargeable batteries, from the pocket-sized batteries found in iPhones and computers to the heavy-duty ones that power electric vehicles  and home energy storage. This makes it a critical resource in the new energy economy. But there isn’t enough usable lithium to meet growing demand, and some experts fear that the trend threatens our ability to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C (2.7°F) by 2030. 

Corporations, lawmakers, and entrepreneurs are attempting to ramp up capacity, but problematic supply chains and China’s market dominance present significant challenges. Plus, lithium extraction is a messy business, and debate is growing about whether to mine and refine in the U.S.

 

 

From CFR 

 

James McBride and Anshu Siripurapu “How Does the U.S. Power Grid Work?

 

Shannon K. O’Neil, “U.S. Should Look South for Better Supply Chains

 

 

From Our Guests

 

Frank Fannon and Michael R. Pompeo, “Time for a Responsible Clean Energy Supply Chain,” Foreign Policy

 

Frank Fannon, “US needs to lead the way in building a new energy supply chain,” Financial Times

 

Vijay Vaitheeswaran, “How can the world’s energy be decarbonised?,” Economist 

 

Vijay Vaitheeswaran and Iain Carson, ZOOM: The Global Race to Fuel the Car of the Future, Twelve 

 

 

Read More

 

Cade Metz, “Your Batteries Are Due for Disruption,” New York Times

 

Clifford Krauss, “Green-Energy Race Draws an American Underdog to Bolivia’s Lithium,” New York Times

 

Ivan Penn and Eric Lipton, “The electric-vehicle race is creating a gold rush for lithium, raising environmental concerns.,” New York Times

 

Justine Calma, “The US wants to fix its broken lithium battery supply chain,” Verge

 

Keith Bradsher and Michael Forsythe, “Why a Chinese Company Dominates Electric Car Batteries,” New York Times

 

MacDonald Dzirutwe and Tom Daly, “China’s Huayou buys lithium mine in Zimbabwe for $422 mln,” Reuters 

 

Mary Hui, “China’s lithium companies are in an investment frenzy,” Quartz

 

 

Watch and Listen 

 

Going Green With Lithium Has Environmentalists Torn,” Vice News

 

Lithium 101,” National Geographic

 

South America’s Lithium Boom: A Blessing Or A Curse?,” NowThis World

 

The ‘white gold rush’: Inside a lithium mine, where stores of recyclable energy lie,” ABC News 

 

Will green technology kill Chile’s deserts?,” The Guardian

Trade

Global trade tensions are boiling over and questions about the United States’ economic future are at the center of the debate. As trade experts question what comes next, it’s important to analyze how the United States got to this point. How have the current administration’s trade policies of today reshaped the global order of tomorrow?

U.S. Trade Deficit

The United States has had a trade deficit, meaning we import more than we export, for the past fifty years. But recently the trade deficit has become a front-burner issue for President Donald Trump and a core reason for his administration’s sweeping tariff policy. When do trade deficits become a problem? Is the United States already at the tipping point?

Trade

With allies and adversaries alike impacted by new economic barriers and tariffs, the global map of U.S. trade relationships hangs in question. As the U.S. rethinks its commitments with its trading partners, allies may seek deals elsewhere, even with historic rivals. Can the president single-handedly tear up a trade deal, and what happens when deals that took decades to craft are suddenly up for renegotiation?

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Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.