The Case for Rebuilding Ukraine

Russia has caused unprecedented damage in Ukraine. And with no diplomatic end in sight to the conflict, many Ukrainians are wondering when, if ever, they will be able to go back to their homes. According to many experts, the answer is actually sooner rather than later. Can reconstruction begin before a war ends? Who pays, and where should world leaders begin?

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Host
  • Gabrielle Sierra
    Director, Podcasting
Credits

Asher Ross - Supervising Producer

Markus Zakaria - Audio Producer and Sound Designer

Molly McAnany - Associate Podcast Producer

Episode Guests
  • Philip Zelikow
    White Burkett Miller Professor of History and Miller Center Wilson Newman Professor of Governance, University of Virginia
  • Sam Greene
    Director of the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, Professor of Russian Politics, King's College London

Show Notes

As Russia’s invasion continues to crush Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy with equal abandon, the pressure is on to rebuild the country. But reconstructing Ukraine is going to be expensive, and domestic support for Ukraine in the United States and other donor countries is shrinking. To pay for this massive undertaking, and to lift the taxpayer burden on Ukraine’s financiers, some experts have proposed using $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s recovery. While some economists see risks with that plan, nearly all agree that getting reconstruction right could help create a more peaceful world.

 

 

From CFR

 

Noah Berman and Anshu Siripurapu, “One Year of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?” 

 

Jonathan Masters, “How Frozen Russian Assets Could Pay for Rebuilding in Ukraine

 

Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts.

 

Diana Roy, “How Bad Is Ukraine’s Humanitarian Crisis a Year Later?

 

 

From Our Guests

 

Lawrence H. Summers, Philip Zelikow, and Robert B. Zoellick, “The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs

 

Sam Greene, “The Black Box of Moscow,” Foreign Affairs

 

 

Read More

 

James Dobbins, Charles P. Ries, Howard J. Shatz, and Gabrielle Tarini, “Reconstructing Ukraine: Creating a Freer, More Prosperous, and Secure Future,” RAND Corporation

 

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” United Nations

 

 

Watch and Listen

 

Should Ukraine Get Russia’s Frozen Assets? Larry Summers vs Benn Steil” Open to Debate

 

Trade

Global trade tensions are boiling over and questions about the United States’ economic future are at the center of the debate. As trade experts question what comes next, it’s important to analyze how the United States got to this point. How have the current administration’s trade policies of today reshaped the global order of tomorrow?

U.S. Trade Deficit

The United States has had a trade deficit, meaning we import more than we export, for the past fifty years. But recently the trade deficit has become a front-burner issue for President Donald Trump and a core reason for his administration’s sweeping tariff policy. When do trade deficits become a problem? Is the United States already at the tipping point?

Trade

With allies and adversaries alike impacted by new economic barriers and tariffs, the global map of U.S. trade relationships hangs in question. As the U.S. rethinks its commitments with its trading partners, allies may seek deals elsewhere, even with historic rivals. Can the president single-handedly tear up a trade deal, and what happens when deals that took decades to craft are suddenly up for renegotiation?

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China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.