The Future Is African

Projections show that by 2050, Africa’s population will double. By 2100, one in three people on Earth will be African. This means that, by the end of the century, sub-Saharan Africa—which already has an extraordinarily young population—will be home to almost half of the young people in the world. In this episode, two experts examine whether Africa’s youth boom will be a blessing or a curse.

Play Button Pause Button
0:00 0:00
x
Host
  • Gabrielle Sierra
    Director, Podcasting
Episode Guests
  • Michelle Gavin
    Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies
  • John Githongo
    Inuka Kenya Trust, CEO

Show Notes

In most African countries, 70 percent or more of the population is under the age of thirty, a youth bulge that is projected to accelerate for decades to come. Some experts feel that if properly harnessed, the youth boom could propel the continent to new levels of economic and geopolitical power. Others suggest that without innovation, rapid development, and massive job creation, it could instead lead to worse levels of poverty, unemployment, and conflict. In the meantime, countries such as China are moving quickly to invest in Africa’s future, while the United States and other Western nations have taken more passive roles.

 

From CFR

 

Nigeria and the Nation-State, John Campbell

 

China in Africa,” Eleanor Albert

 

Ethiopia: East Africa’s Emerging Giant,” Claire Felter

 

A Conversation with Dr. K.Y. Amoako on the Future of African Development,” Michelle Gavin

 

Amid Major Transformations, Africa Will Play an Important Role in Shaping the Future,” Michelle Gavin

 

The United States and Europe Should Work Together to Promote a Prosperous Africa,” Michelle Gavin

 

How to Think About Africa’s ‘Rising Middle Class’ Amid COVID-19,” John Campbell

 

From John Githongo

 

Africa’s Generational War,” Foreign Policy

 

Read More

 

Charts of the Week: Africa’s changing demographics,” Brookings Institution

 

Youth Empowerment,” United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa 

 

Africa’s Population Will Double by 2050,” Economist

 

Kenya’s changing population captured in 100 photos,” BBC

 

Africa 2050: Demographic Truth and Consequences,” Hoover Institution 

 

Population Facts, December 2019 [PDF],” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

 

Africa’s population boom: burden or opportunity?,” Institute for Security Studies

 

China Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins University

 

Watch or Listen

 

How Africa’s population boom is changing our world,” BBC

 

Yes She Can, with Candice Chirwa,” Africa Matters

 

How Will a Population Boom Change Africa?,” BBC’s The Inquiry


 
 

Trade

Global trade tensions are boiling over and questions about the United States’ economic future are at the center of the debate. As trade experts question what comes next, it’s important to analyze how the United States got to this point. How have the current administration’s trade policies of today reshaped the global order of tomorrow?

U.S. Trade Deficit

The United States has had a trade deficit, meaning we import more than we export, for the past fifty years. But recently the trade deficit has become a front-burner issue for President Donald Trump and a core reason for his administration’s sweeping tariff policy. When do trade deficits become a problem? Is the United States already at the tipping point?

Trade

With allies and adversaries alike impacted by new economic barriers and tariffs, the global map of U.S. trade relationships hangs in question. As the U.S. rethinks its commitments with its trading partners, allies may seek deals elsewhere, even with historic rivals. Can the president single-handedly tear up a trade deal, and what happens when deals that took decades to craft are suddenly up for renegotiation?

Top Stories on CFR

Trade

President Trump doubled almost all aluminum and steel import tariffs, seeking to curb China’s growing dominance in global trade. These six charts show the tariffs’ potential economic effects.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.