The China-Philippines Standoff, With Derek Grossman

LINDSAY:
Welcome to the President's Inbox. I'm Jim Lindsay, the Mary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the China-Philippines Standoff.
With me to discuss the ongoing confrontation between China and the Philippines over their competing claims in the South China Sea and what it all means for the United States is Derek Grossman. Derek is a senior defense analyst at RAND and professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. He has written extensively on Indo-Pacific security issues, U.S.-China competition and Asian geopolitical competition. Before joining RAND, Derek served for over a decade in the U.S. intelligence community as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He also served in the National Security Agency and worked at the CIA on the President's daily brief. Derek, thank you for joining me on the President's Inbox.

GROSSMAN:
Thanks, Jim. Great to be here. I'm a big fan of the pod.

LINDSAY:
Well, thank you. I love flattery. And let's get right at it. If we could, Derek, could you tell me about the Sierra Madre, the ship that the Philippines ran aground in the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands about twenty-five years ago?

GROSSMAN:
Sure, yeah. So the Sierra Madre as a World War II-era Navy ship that as you said, the Philippines decided to intentionally ground back in 1999. And the reason why they did that is to demonstrate by forming a new military facility on Second Thomas Shoal, that their exclusive economics on their EEZ is in fact their EEZ, both legally and per international norms of behavior. And that has really angered the Chinese because the Chinese have a very expansive claim in the South China Sea based on historical territorial rights. So in contravention of international law norms behavior, that overlaps with the Second Thomas Shoal and many other features between the Philippines and China.

LINDSAY:
And the Chinese claim is what we know as the nine-dash line?

GROSSMAN:
That's right. Although it's been recently updated to the ten-dash line, which includes a dash through the Taiwan Strait, but it's commonly still referred to as the nine-dash line.

LINDSAY:
So help me understand a little bit about what we're talking about specifically in terms of the Spratly Islands and the Second Thomas Shoal. We're not talking about beachfront property where you put up a beach umbrella and bring a cooler of your favorite adult beverages. These are maritime features that are under the water, but close to the surface. So why exactly does having a ship, which by my understanding is rotting and falling apart, prove any claim?

GROSSMAN:
Well, like you said, these are not beachfront property. In fact, I am very careful not to say that they are islands because many or most of them are actually not islands by the technical definition. I like to use the term features because many are submerged during high tide and things like that. So in the case of grounding the Sierra Madre, the purpose was to show that this is, in fact part of the Philippines' EEZ. It's one way to do it. It's not the only way to do it, of course. And the reality is in the Spratly Islands, that's where most of the disputes are in the South China Sea.
There's several other areas. For example, the Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, there's others, right? But the Spratlys is where there's the most overlap, not just between China and the Philippines, but also between China and Malaysia. China and Brunei, a little bit between China and Indonesia, even though Indonesia is not a formal counterclaimant to China on this. Right? And then of course, Vietnam and then all of the countries that I just mentioned in Southeast Asia, they to some extent have overlapping claims with each other. So this is a dispute that is ongoing and doesn't really have a clear solution. Back in 2014, the Philippines took China to an international arbitration tribunal, and they were able to get a ruling in 2016 in their favor. But that's a court ruling and not necessarily an enforceable ruling. Right? So that's why the standoffs continue in the South China Sea.

LINDSAY:
So Derek, help me understand the legal issue at play, because China is a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Philippines is as well. The reason that countries drafted UNCLOS, as it's called, was to settle issues like this. So why is there a dispute, particularly given that Philippines did win this international tribunal hearing? And I understand the Chinese rejected the conclusion of the international tribunal, but I often hear Chinese officials tell me how they're committed to the rule of law and a stable world order in peaceful relations. So what is their argument for giving the back of the hand to this finding by an international arbitration panel?

GROSSMAN:
Yeah, it's really quite the contradiction, Jim, because China was one of the originators of UNCLOS. They were in the room when it was formed. And several decades have passed now, and what I think has changed is that China has improved its military capabilities. It is much stronger in the South China Sea and elsewhere, mainly due to its strong economy. And it is said on many occasions that essentially might makes right, bigger countries should rule over smaller countries. And not to mention that Xi Jinping who rose to power in 2012 and has been there since, the leader of China, he has been dusting off maps from the Ming and Qing dynasty, so hundreds of years ago to demonstrate that Chinese fishermen have traditionally fished in these waters. So when I mentioned earlier that their claims are based on historical territorial rights, we're talking really about, these are Chinese sovereign waters dating back to when China was really the center of the world, was a great empire before mostly Western colonialism and later Japanese colonialism reduced China to a much weaker country.
And so Xi Jinping's mandate, as he sees it, is essentially to rejuvenate China by 2049, which is the one hundreth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, to reverse this national century of humiliation that preceded it really from the late 1830s to 1949. And so the South China Sea, they've actually said in the past, it's a core interest. They view it as sovereign waters, not in the sense of it's subjected to international law norms of behavior. And the only reason, Jim, that I can see as to why they've changed their view on it is because they are stronger and more confident today than they were in the past. And the fact that the U.S. has never ratified UNCLOS, we're a signatory to it, but we've never ratified it. That puts us in an awkward position to say that we want to enforce international law norms of behavior, and yet we are not actually fully invested in UNCLOS. So that's another side problem that creates more problems for us.

LINDSAY:
So Derek, help me understand the practical consequences of the Chinese claim. I take it that there are references by Xi to traditional Chinese fishing waters. I'm not quite clear as to why going someplace to fish gives you sovereign right over those fishing grounds. But we'll push that aside. Is there a strategic interest here or an economic interest here that's driving Chinese claims?

GROSSMAN:
So I think for sure there's an economic interest because there's always talk about the potential for large oil and gas deposits at the bottom of the South China Sea, but more recently with deep sea mining becoming a thing. And we're actually just days away from the United Nations International Seabed Authority making a big decision on whether countries can offer third party nations access to their EEZ to do deep sea mining within them. And China is going to have a lot of these licenses potentially, especially out in the Pacific Islands region. So there's a lot at stake in terms of deep sea mining of critical minerals in order to make batteries to make electric vehicles, things like that, military technology as part of it, nickel and cobalt are big ones, lithium as well. So there's that aspect for sure. But I would say that the most important thing, frankly, is the fishing, right?
Because as China's middle class continues to expand, literally and figuratively, their appetite for fish and more broadly for seafood is exploding. And so China has to be able to meet that demand by continuing to fish. And what has happened in the South China Sea? Overfishing, and it's not just China, it's also Vietnam and the Philippines in particular, but there's others who are engaged in overfishing destruction of the coral reef environments, which serve as the ecosystems for the fish, so the fish cannot reproduce. And not to mention, there's also pollution that dramatically impacts the condition of the South China Sea and climate change where fish are moving away to different areas.
And so I've been told by scientists on this that in fact, fisheries in the South China Sea might be ninety percent gone and never coming back. And that's why we see Chinese deep sea fleets farther afield from the South China Sea. But that doesn't mean that there aren't still some good areas of fishing. Scarborough Shoal in particular, which is also disputed with the Philippines. China took it over peacefully and I mean peacefully, quote unquote, right? But peacefully in 2012 by using its Coast Guard and elbowing Filipino fishermen out of the way. There's still really good fishing there. There's still really good fishing in the East China Sea at the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute, which is just off to the side of the South China Sea.

LINDSAY:
And that involves the Japanese?

GROSSMAN:
Yeah, yeah. Disputed with the Japanese. So there's still, I think a huge component of fishing there. And then strategically, I mean, why not have bases in the South China Sea? Right now, China has three in the Spratlys, one in the Paracels, in order to continue to intimidate regional neighbors that can't fight back as effectively as the United States. Most importantly, Vietnam, right? Vietnam's EEZ has tremendous overlap with China, and China wants to be able to intimidate Vietnam so that they are unable to conduct fishing there alongside the Chinese or without the permission of the Chinese.

LINDSAY:
The confrontation between China in the Philippines, Derek, has seemingly escalated over the last twelve to eighteen months as the Chinese have sent vessels in to prevent the Philippines from resupplying the Naval and Marine contingent that is on the Sierra Madre. And again, this is part of the desire of Manila to want to establish that this is its EEZ. My understanding is again, that the Sierra Madre is showing the wear and tear of being essentially run aground on a reef for twenty-five years subjected to the elements. So tell me a little bit about the nature of the escalation and what each side sees itself as doing.

GROSSMAN:
So for the Filipino side, their primary objective is maintaining the Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal, as you mentioned, it's been there now. So really for over twenty-five years, it's rusting away. And in order to keep that ship in place as part of their resupply, they need to bring in materials that can reinforce the ship. And in addition, they have Filipino troops that are stationed on the ship, so they need to do waste removal, and they need to bring in food and other supplies to maintain that outpost. For the Chinese side, they're trying to disrupt that resupply, and ultimately what they want is for the Philippines to drag the ship off Second Thomas, admit that they were wrong in grounding it in the first place. But a second-best option would be to have the Sierra Madre simply just fall apart into the ocean. And then there is no more need for a resupply.
So what's wound up happening is that every few months, the Filipinos need to do the resupply. And they were not telling the Chinese in advance that they were going to do this, but of course, the Chinese with their advanced surveillance capabilities were able to tell well in advance that the Philippines were going to do this. And so then they would intercept. And in order to not trigger the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty from 1951, which says that if the Philippines' government or military assets are ever attacked, that would trigger the treaty that would bring the U.S. into the fold. So in order to not trigger that treaty, the Chinese have been engaged in gray zone operations. And this has taken multiple forms such as firing water cannons at resupply ships, harassing them, trying to blind assets with military-grade lasers, things like that. I was actually in the Philippines the week after June 17 last year, which was when things really came to a head, because during a resupply, a Philippine Navy ship was rammed by a Chinese ship, and one of the sailors lost his thumb.
And that was considered a humanitarian situation, so the Philippines called for China to stop so that they can get emergency personnel in to evacuate him. And then in the weeks that followed, and I kind of had a front seat for this, Manila was trying to figure out, "Well, what can we do to lower tensions?" And so by the following month, by July of 2024, China and the Philippines reached a provisional agreement quote unquote. The details have never been disclosed publicly, but what it sounds like, and both sides dispute what's in it, of course, but what it sounds like is that the Philippines quietly agreed to give a twenty-four-hour notice to China that they're about to do the resupply, and that China would also be assured that there are no materials in there that could buttress the ship, although that's... What counts and what doesn't, I mean, that I think is up for real debate.
And so what we have seen since July of 2024 is really a dialing back of tensions at the Second Thomas Shoal, which I think is interesting. It could serve as a template going forward, but to what extent did the Philippines kind of sacrifice its sovereignty in making such an agreement? I think we can have that debate.

LINDSAY:
I will note that the Chinese may have dialed things back from the actions of mid-June of last year, but in September, a Chinese vessel rammed a resupply ship that happened to be carrying a crew of 60 Minutes people who are covering the story. So it's not as if the Chinese have taken an entirely Pacific approach to the dispute.

GROSSMAN:
Well, the Chinese have been clear that the provisional agreement only relates to Second Thomas Shoal. That's it. And so for other disputes, they'd have to come up with new provisional agreements.

LINDSAY:
And I should note that when we talk about the Second Thomas Shoal, it is far closer to Philippines territory than it is to Chinese territory. It's about a hundred and twenty miles west of Palawan Island in the Philippines, and it's more than six hundred miles from Hanyan Island, which is sort of the closest undisputed piece of Chinese territory.

GROSSMAN:
That's correct, Jim.

LINDSAY:
So you mentioned the issue of the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. Help me understand what it is that the United States has actually committed to doing under the terms of that mutual defense treaty. And I ask because I've heard some descriptions of the treaty that suggest it is different than the Mutual Defense Treaty the United States has with Japan in that the Regional Defense Treaty with the Philippines has a specific reference to undisputed Filipino territory.

GROSSMAN:
So I think what I would say there is that the U.S. and the Philippines have had this treaty since 1951, and it's pretty clear that as part of it, the U.S. will help the Philippines to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Now, that said, the U.S. has never taken a position on whether the features within the Spratly Islands or anywhere in the South China Sea for that matter, belong to one country or another. The only thing that has happened is in 2020 during the first Trump administration, you had then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo come out with a statement saying essentially that nations EEZ's, they do exist and are in fact legal. And that was a big statement because up to that point, the U.S. hadn't even said that.
And so the Philippines and Vietnam and others roundly applauded the EEZ statement. But then they said, "Hey, how about a little bit more? How about you comment on the disputed territories?" And that is something we have not done. Now, in the case of Japan, we have said that Japan's claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyudo dispute is in fact part of Japan. So we labeled those islands as the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and we have further said that if those islands are ever attacked, they fall under the Mutual Defense Treaty we have with Japan. That's very different than what we have with the Philippines. Now, that said, we also continue to talk about how our alliance with the Philippines as quote unquote ironclad. You can go back and look at the Biden administration and how many times that term was used. Many, right? And now it's carried over to the Trump administration. It doesn't seem as if there's much daylight between Biden and Trump on helping the Philippines to defend itself in this dispute.

LINDSAY:
Does that surprise you, Derek, that the Trump administration seems to be continuing the Biden administration's policy vis-a-vis the Philippines?

GROSSMAN:
Generally it does not, because I mean, when you look at the first Trump administration, that's the first administration that came out with the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Biden kept the Indo-Pacific Strategy, made some tweaks, and we're all expecting that the second Trump administration will have another Indo-Pacific Strategy. They have made it clear that countering China is still a top priority. I just saw that the Trump administration may actually provide more arms to Taiwan this term than it did in its first term.
And Taiwan is extremely jittery right now. I mean, they're watching closely what happened between the U.S. and Ukraine a few months ago with the blow up in the Oval Office with Zelensky, right? So I mean, there's some real angst about what the Trump administration's going to do with allies and partners worldwide. But interestingly, in the Indo-Pacific, it hasn't had much effect, at least yet in terms of dealing with China and countering China. And the Philippines is viewed as an essential part of that. Let's not forget that the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visited the Philippines. That was one of his first, I think it was his first overseas visit, in fact. Japan and then the Philippines. So in the Indo-Pacific, right?

LINDSAY:
So you take that as the Trump administration trying to signal what it considers to be the importance of U.S. relations with the Philippines.

GROSSMAN:
Yes. But I would add to that it's more about countering China than having a really good relationship with the Philippines, which is what I'm worried about, because I don't want any ally or partner to become a strategic pawn in this greater U.S.-China competition game. And that is, I think we run the risk of that if we're near exclusively focused on China rather than the allies and partners and the agency that they have themselves and the importance that these relationships have in their own right.

LINDSAY:
So what is your sense, Derek, of what Manila wants from the United States? As you know, in all of these situations, if you're the stronger power, you can worry that you may be dragged into conflicts you don't want to be dragged into by your ally because they have interests that may not coincide or align perfectly with yours.

GROSSMAN:
Well, I think the thing that Manila would want most is what I alluded to earlier, which is for the U.S. to come out and say that Second Thomas Shoal, in addition to all of the other disputed territories are part of the Philippines. I mean, that right there, if all territories fell under the alliance, then that would give Manila the assurance and restore deterrence vis-a-vis Beijing that this situation is something that the U.S. plants intervene on if it ever comes to that.
But I think Manila is also pretty reasonable and realistic, and they know that that's unlikely because of what you said, that the U.S. would have to get involved in a conflict that it didn't want to get involved in necessarily. And so what is the next level down? I think it's providing the Philippines with the military weapons that it needs to expand the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the EDCA program that allows the U.S. military to have seamless access to nine different bases throughout the Philippines. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has said that those bases are not for offensive purposes. They're for defensive purposes and for humanitarian assistance-

LINDSAY:
That lies in the eye of the beholder, I suppose.

GROSSMAN:
Yeah, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, except if there is a conflict, it doesn't make sense that we would not have access to those EDCA sites. So I think the military side is a big component to it, but then there's a question about how much more can the Philippines really absorb, given that they can't afford a lot of the equipment, and they're starting at a fairly low level of capability, so we may have to invest in more niche capabilities. I think an interesting point was when India sold the BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles to the Philippines, they could afford that, and it's extremely useful in a South China Sea context. So I would like to see more of that. I think the Philippines would as well. But of course, it's not just military, it's also economic and diplomatic. So it's really, it's everything put into one that they're looking for.

LINDSAY:
What about the flip side, Derek? What is the possibility that Manila decides, for whatever reason, that it should cut a deal with the Chinese, perhaps because they're worried that the United States won't come to the raid, perhaps because they just sort of survey the playing field and decide that perhaps they can trade their claims to China for something? I think that was part of a policy that motivated the last Filipino president, Mr. Duterte. Is there any chance that the Philippines will simply say, "This game is not worth fighting."?

GROSSMAN:
I mean, there always is, right? But I think the chances are pretty low because Duterte's time in office demonstrated that that simply doesn't work. Literally, when he came to office in 2016, he said, "Bye-bye Washington. Hello Beijing." And he made his first overseas visit to China, and he met with Xi Jinping-

LINDSAY:
That's a nice way of summarizing what he said to the United States, Derek.

GROSSMAN:
Yeah. Yeah, true. I'm trying to be as diplomatic as I can be here, Jim.

LINDSAY:
You're doing a very good job. We're not going to use the same language that President Duterte used, particularly toward President Obama.

GROSSMAN:
He's quite rude and uncouth. True. But he tried that and it failed miserably. And why did it fail? Well, one of the reasons is because the things that they were talking about, which was China's going to use Belt and Road initiative to help build up the Philippines, and it would dovetail with Duterte's own Build, Build, Build or BBB program. Those projects never got off and going. There's some controversy about why, but the reality is Philippines never benefited from them. Also, joint exploration was another big one in the South China Sea, but when you talk about joint exploration for oil and gas and other things, who's going to lead that joint exploration? China said, "We're going to lead it because it's ours." And Philippines said, "We're going to lead because it's ours." So they were never able to come to an agreement because of these issues. Another big one is that the Filipino people are overwhelmingly pro-U.S. and very suspicious of China, if not anti-China.
And the armed services in the Philippines in particular is very pro-U.S. I mean, there's no other power that they cooperate more with, more often with and get more support from than the United States. All you got to do is look at the annual Balikatan Exercises. Those have expanded over time, right? Covering different issues. Last year, it covered the potential for China to attack Taiwan. To the Philippines' north, Taiwan is less than a hundred miles away from Filipino territory. So they're kind of expanding the aperture. It's not just South China Sea. They're looking at a whole host of different issues to help the Philippines. The Philippines is comprehensive archipelagic defense concept, which came out in early 2024. It's actually, well, it's never been released publicly. It's like the best kept secret in the Philippines, but it's been exchanged privately with the U.S., and it's all about beefing up the Philippines as maritime defenses to deal with South China Sea, to deal with Taiwan, other things.
It's hard to underscore here, Jim. That's a monumental change in Filipino thinking, because traditionally the Philippines, like many other countries around the world, was Army-centric and was focused on internal issues. So I mean, the Philippines is changing quite a bit, I think, in a good way for the U.S., right? And Duterte's path led to no reward for the Philippines. But we do have a big election coming up in 2028, and Sarah Duterte, who is the daughter of Rodrigo Duterte, right? There are big questions about whether she shares her father's view.

LINDSAY:
And she's the current vice president, correct?

GROSSMAN:
She's the current vice president, and there's big concerns about would she maybe go back to the way Duterte's policy was on China? I suspect the answer is no, because it failed miserably and she wouldn't want to see a repeat of that. But you never know. Yeah, you never know.

LINDSAY:
What role are American allies in East Asia and Oceania playing in this? Any role for Japan? Any role for Australia?

GROSSMAN:
Absolutely. Yeah. So I mean, one of the things that the Philippines has been doing is reaching out to neighboring countries to sign defense and security agreements with them. And so with Japan, there's a reciprocal access pact that they've signed, so Japanese troops can actually deploy to the Philippines and vice versa. This is a whole other segment for you, but for Japan to be engaging in these types of agreements is-

LINDSAY:
Japan is changing before our eyes.

GROSSMAN:
I mean, this is an incredible change as well for Japan to break out of their mostly pacifist constitution that prioritizes defense of Japan. They're doing stuff abroad now. Australia, same deal, right? Engaging with the Philippines in all sorts of different ways. Exercise agreement. New Zealand now wants to have its own reciprocal access agreement potentially. And so yeah, there's a lot of churn with that. But I mean, if there is a war between China and the Philippines, I mean, to what extent are these allies and partners actually going to support the Philippines? That is an unknown. But I mean, as we have conversations with them, especially in tri-lateral and broader multilateral venues, we are able to get a better sense of how they're all thinking about a potential for conflict and how they might support or not.

LINDSAY:
I can't imagine, Derek, that Beijing looks fondly upon these overtures by the Australians and New Zealanders, the Japanese to beef up ties with the Philippines, even if their military capabilities they bring to bear, particularly I think Australia, even more so New Zealand might not be that great.

GROSSMAN:
Yeah, I mean, if China were to engage in war against the Philippines and not have to worry about intervention by anybody, it would be an easy victory. And they know that, and the Philippines actually knows that, right? So that's why the Philippines has to have this stronger relationship with the United States and branch out to others to give it more than just a fighting chance. So yeah, that's why I think we see this.
Now, one of the things that the Philippines is prioritize is this assertive transparency initiative, which is to videotape every incident that happens and to post it for the entire world to see. And this has been pretty interesting because when China comes out with its narrative saying, "Hey, we never did anything bad. It was all the Filipinos' fault." Well, the Philippines can run back the tape. They have the receipts. And so that galvanized public opinion against China. Is it a silver bullet in and of itself? Certainly not. But it is something that I think has been helping.

LINDSAY:
Are we at the risk, Derek, of significant escalation in this confrontation in the months to come? Either because China has grown tired of the resupply effort, or as I've heard that the Sierra Madre is so old that eventually it is going to fall apart, the Filipinos will not be able to send in another vessel or to shore up the existing one for the reasons that you've already mentioned. Just give me some sort of assessment of whether you think this is sort of in a stasis and we're not going to think much about it, or whether all of a sudden people around the world are going to learn about the Second Scarborough Shoal.

GROSSMAN:
Yeah. So I think it's great that the provisional agreement has been holding, but I don't expect it to hold forever or even really into the next year or two. And I say that because there's already reporting out there talking about how the Chinese are bringing in much larger fishing fleets and in particular fishing militia fleets. So these are armed fishermen who actually work on behalf of the People's Liberation Army.

LINDSAY:
Are they really fisher people or are they people who are essentially just projections of the Chinese state and the Chinese military?

GROSSMAN:
Our assessment of it is that they are in fact fisher people. However, to make extra money, they sign up to get some small arms training, some reconnaissance and surveillance training, and that is funded and provided by the Navy. And so it's like, remember after 9/11 those signs, you would see that say, "If you see something, say something."? That is what these fishermen are doing, this fishing militia. And so they will literally get on their walkie-talkies and call in for support when they see something, and it usually starts with the Coast Guard and then escalates to the Navy. The Coast Guard, however, they're painting gray Hulls white. So some of the Chinese Coast Guard ships are actually ex-Navy ships. And that's bad because that blurs the escalation ladder quite a bit. I mean, no Coast Guard should be subjected to responding to essentially a Navy interfering with them, but that's what China's doing.
So there are initial reports out there saying that the Chinese are bringing in larger fishing militia fleets, larger Coast Guard fleets that are supported by the Navy, and it's unclear why they're doing this at this particular time. I mean, the easy answer is it's the beginning of the summer fishing season, and they want to make sure that there are no incidents, and to do that, they have to back it up by force. But this is the first time we've seen in a while, if not ever, that they've brought in such large fleets, and so now there are concerns that, well, maybe they're testing whether the U.S. is willing to really support the Philippines and to support to some extent Vietnam and Malaysia and Brunei and Indonesia in their squabbles against the Chinese, right? Anytime there's a new president, in the first few months we see China and Russia and others trying to probe and see to what extent the U.S. is really going to be a credible player with this new administration. So there may be an aspect of that as well. It's kind of hard to tell.

LINDSAY:
What I hear you telling me, Derek, is stay tuned.

GROSSMAN:
It's always stay tuned, Jim. Yep.

LINDSAY:
On that note, I'll close up this episode of the President's Inbox. My guest has been Derek Grossman, senior defense analyst at RAND and professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. Derek, thank you very much for joining me.

GROSSMAN:
Thanks. Thanks, Jim. Take care.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to the President's Inbox on Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Spotify, wherever you listen and leave us a review. We love the feedback. A transcript of our conversation is available on the podcast page for the President's Inbox on CFR.org. As always, opinions expressed on the President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's episode was produced by Justin Schuster with recording engineer Eli Gonzalez and director of podcasting, Gabrielle Sierra. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.