Global Inflation Tracker
from Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies
from Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies

Global Inflation Tracker

The CFR Global Inflation Tracker allows you to gauge trends in prices across the world over time.

Last updated March 25, 2025 1:35 pm (EST)

Tracker

The CFR Global Inflation Tracker allows you to gauge trends in prices across the world over time.

Inflation Data by Country

The map below aids in gauging inflation trends in almost two hundred countries around the world—mainly those that report data to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The inflation rate is defined as the rate of change in the consumer price level over the prior twelve months. Each country is shaded according to its year-over-year rate of inflation, with darker colors indicating higher inflation. Hover over a particular country to see its latest data, and, to view changes over time, use the slider above the map to adjust the date. Use the drop-down menu to select which item to view. [1]

The map highlights, for example, how inflation reacted to COVID-19 disruptions beginning in early 2020. As businesses shuttered, consumers spent less and saved more. Median global inflation fell from 2.2 percent to 1.9 percent that year. In 2021 and 2022, consumer demand recovered far more rapidly than supply, which was limited by labor shortages, supply-chain interruptions, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Between the third quarters of 2020 and 2022, median global inflation soared from 1.9 percent to 8.7 percent. This contrasts with the experience of the Great Recession, when median global inflation fell from 9.9 percent in the third quarter of 2008 to 1.7 percent in the third quarter of 2009. While still elevated above its pre-COVID-19 level, median global inflation moderated to 3.1 percent in quarter 2 of 2024. Central banks are now one-by-one ending their tightening cycles.

Inflation Data by Quarter

The charts below compile data on inflation trends in almost two hundred economies going back to 1990. Each chart shows the year-over-year inflation rates for fourteen different items.[2]

Use the rightmost drop-down menu above the chart to toggle among those items. The leftmost menu lets you select groups of countries for display. You can create a custom list of countries or filter them by region. Hover over the charts to see a country’s inflation rate within particular years.

Together, the charts reveal significant trends in global inflation. Food prices, for example, are notoriously volatile, owing in particular to shocks caused by extreme weather. Over the last three decades, median food inflation has ranged from 1 percent to more than 14 percent.

Components of Total Inflation

The final large chart below allows you to view, for each country, the historical percentage-point contributions of five categories of inflation (food, energy, housing, services, and other) to total inflation.[3] The sum of the percentage-point contributions of each category equals a given country’s total inflation rate. Use the leftmost drop-down menu to choose which country to view.

The charts highlight how a category’s contribution to total inflation can change considerably over time. In 2021, for example, energy inflation, driven by robust economic recovery from the pandemic, constituted almost a third of the total U.S. inflation rate of 4.7 percent. This contrasts with 2015, when falling energy prices made a substantial negative contribution to the total U.S. inflation rate of 0.1 percent.

Please also visit our Global Monetary Policy TrackerGlobal Imbalances TrackerGlobal Growth TrackerGlobal Trade TrackerGlobal Energy TrackerSovereign Risk Tracker, and Central Bank Currency Swaps Tracker.

Data Notes

The data displayed in the maps and charts above is calculated using data from the IMF’s consumer price index (CPI), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank's Global Database of Inflation, and Eurostat. All rates are expressed as twelve-month percent changes. The inflation data displayed is quarterly for all countries except the following, for which data annual data is displayed: Argentina, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Curaçao, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Romania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yemen. Additionally, energy data for the following countries is displayed as an annual rate, while all other categories are displayed as quarterly rates: Brazil, Mauritius, and Saudi Arabia. The percentage-point contributions of inflation components in the bar charts are annual.

[1] Just over half of countries publish their inflation data with a delay, typically 1-2 quarters. To view a more complete map, please use the slider to scroll back to the previous quarters. 

[2] Following the methodology of Jongrim and Ohnsorg (2021), the IMF’s measure of housing, water, electricity, and gas inflation is used in place of energy inflation for the countries that lack energy inflation data.

[3] Eurostat’s HICP data is used for the twenty-seven European Union countries (excluding Sweden) as well as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. All other data comes from the OECD. Owing to lack of comparability across countries, the housing component excludes imputed rents. The services component excludes services related to housing (actual rents, imputed rents, and services for maintenance and repairs of the dwelling). If a country lacks data for a certain component, the contribution to total inflation of that component is included in the “Other” category. For example, the percentage-point contribution of Colombia’s housing inflation to Colombia’s total inflation rate is captured within its “Other” category. The same goes for the services inflation components of Chile, Estonia, Greece, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Trade

President Trump doubled almost all aluminum and steel import tariffs, seeking to curb China’s growing dominance in global trade. These six charts show the tariffs’ potential economic effects.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.