China in Europe: February 2025
from China Strategy Initiative and China 360
from China Strategy Initiative and China 360

China in Europe: February 2025

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Munich, Germany, February 15, 2025.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Munich, Germany, February 15, 2025. Sven Hoppe/Pool via REUTERS

Beijing’s efforts to charm Europe remain undercut by deep mistrust, sanctions clashes, and an assertive diplomatic style.

May 28, 2025 3:02 pm (EST)

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Munich, Germany, February 15, 2025.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Munich, Germany, February 15, 2025. Sven Hoppe/Pool via REUTERS
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Lu Shaye Appointment: Beijing’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European affairs in early February raised concerns across Europe. Lu earned a reputation as a “wolf warrior” while he served as China’s ambassador to France, where he notoriously claimed in 2023 that former Soviet republics “have no effective status in international law”—a statement that provoked outrage from multiple European Union (EU) capitals. At his new post, Lu is tasked with “coordination and handling of European affairs” and “consultations and exchanges with European countries and EU institutions,” according to Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun. Observers across Europe interpreted the move as a hardline signal from Beijing. “Lu’s appointment represents inflexibility on everything that matters,” warned Mathieu Duchâtel of Institut Montaigne, adding that European diplomats fear “any diplomatic meeting” will turn “into some sort of ideological confrontation.” Lu also courted controversy when he suggested in 2022 that Taiwan’s population undergo “re-education” following a Chinese takeover.

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Wang Yi Hits Europe: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi launched a high-profile European tour, visiting London, Dublin, and Munich. In London, Wang cochaired the tenth round of the China-UK Strategic Dialogue, which marked the first such high-level dialogue in a decade. Following talks with Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Foreign Secretary David Lammy, and National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell, Wang touted “fruitful results” and the resumption of “exchanges at all levels,” describing “the huge potential of practical cooperation between the two countries.” Despite warm rhetoric, human rights and security tensions were evident. Lammy pledged that the UK would “engage frankly on the areas where our views differ,” including the imprisonment of pro-democracy Hong Kong tycoon Jimmy Lai, human rights, and the sanctioning of British parliamentarians. Wang also “comprehensively” outlined China’s Ukraine position, calling for “no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames.” In Germany, he met with Chancellor Olaf Scholz and incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Wang hailed Scholz’s opposition to EU tariffs as “rational and pragmatic.” Speaking with Merz, he said Germany’s friendly policy toward China is in its national interest.

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Munich Conference: At the Munich Security Conference, Wang met with top European officials including EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. In his exchange with Kallas, Wang asserted that “there is no fundamental conflict of interest or geopolitical conflicts between China and the EU” and emphasized China’s support for Europe’s peace efforts in Ukraine. Kallas stressed the EU’s openness to dialogue on “trade, economic affairs, and climate change,” while pressing China to halt exports of dual-use goods to Russia. “China is a strategic competitor,” Kallas declared at the EU Ambassadors Conference earlier in February; he also called China “increasingly assertive, globally present and competitively so.” On the sidelines of the Munch Conference, Wang’s other meetings further underscored the complexities of China’s European engagement. France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot stressed the “urgent need to return to a calm relationship” while raising alarm over China’s antidumping investigation into French cognac and brandy. Wang responded that China hoped the EU would “uphold open cooperation, support free trade, and work with China in the same direction.” He also met with the Austrian, Czech, and Ukrainian foreign ministers. In Wang’s meeting with Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský, the war in Ukraine took center stage. “I clearly emphasized that the Russian invasion has global consequences that affect the entire world,” Lipavský said.

Spain’s Balancing Act: Spain’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares emerged as one of China’s most sympathetic interlocutors. In a widely cited interview, Albares insisted, “Europe must take its own decisions, on its own. . . . We can have certainly a dialogue with the country that I think is our natural ally, the United States. But Europe must take its own decisions.” He highlighted China’s strategic investments in Spain’s lithium-battery sector and pork exports, calling for a China-Europe policy independent of U.S. influence.

Sanctions Blowback: China reacted furiously after the EU’s sixteenth sanctions package against Russia included Chinese firms. “We urge the EU to stop smearing China,” said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, adding that the move is “undermining the lawful interests of Chinese companies.”

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.