China in the Indo-Pacific: May 2025
from China Strategy Initiative and China 360
from China Strategy Initiative and China 360

China in the Indo-Pacific: May 2025

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holds talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Ishaq Dar in Beijing, China, on May 20, 2025.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holds talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Ishaq Dar in Beijing, China, on May 20, 2025. Zhai Jianlan/Xinhua via Getty Images 

In May 2025, China deepened its strategic footprint by reasserting territorial claims along the China-India border, backing Pakistan militarily during its clash with India, advancing trilateral talks with Pakistan and the Taliban, escalating tensions in the South China Sea, and expanding ties with ASEAN and the Gulf.

June 2, 2025 11:12 am (EST)

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holds talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Ishaq Dar in Beijing, China, on May 20, 2025.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holds talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Ishaq Dar in Beijing, China, on May 20, 2025. Zhai Jianlan/Xinhua via Getty Images 
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

China Reasserts Claims Along Disputed Sino-Indian Border: Just four days after India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs released “standard” names for dozens of locations on the Indian-controlled side of the contested border. Those new names predominantly cover Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls Zangnan and claims as part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Beijing renamed twenty-seven locations, including fifteen mountains, five residential areas, four mountain passes, two rivers, and one lake. India swiftly rejected China’s claims. Although both parties agreed to a border thaw in late 2024, which led to a decrease in deployed troops, the contested territory remains armed on both sides.

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China Shows “Iron Brother” Military Support During India-Pakistan Face-Off: Multiple sources, including India’s Ministry of Defense, say that China provided Pakistan with significant military assistance during India’s recent confrontation with Pakistan. India’s Ministry of Defense has accused China of helping Pakistan reorganize its radar and air defense systems, as well as its satellite coverage, in the lead-up to direct hostilities, to help better detect Indian weapons and personnel deployments. Reports indicate Pakistan also used Chinese PL air-to-air missiles. In anticipation of future clashes, China is now fast-tracking its delivery of stealth fighter jets to Pakistan to challenge India’s air superiority.

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PLA J-10 Features Prominently in India-Pakistan Military Clash: Pakistan used Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets to down Indian aircrafts during its military confrontation between May 7 and 10. The successful downing of Western-made Rafales marks the first time J-10Cs are used in combat. In response to their successful deployment, China has used hedged language: shortly after an Indian fighter jet was shot down, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Kiang said he was “not aware” of Chinese fighter jet involvement. However, on May 17, China’s state broadcaster declared the J-10C jets “achieved combat results for the first time.”

China Claims It will Play Peacemaker, Diplomatically Supports Pakistan: China’s Foreign Ministry publicly called on both nuclear-armed neighbors to deescalate, positioning itself as a peacemaker between the two sides. Beijing even offered to play a constructive role in maintaining regional peace and stability. However, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, reaffirmed his country’s “ironclad friendship” with Pakistan, saying China “fully understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests.”

Beijing Applies Diplomatic and Economic Pressure to India: China reportedly blocked several Indian proposals at the UN Security Council to ban five Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taaiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists and designate them global terrorists. Beijing also blocked New Delhi’s efforts to sanction the Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of LeT, at the Security Council. China is pairing diplomatic with economic pressure, dialing up the two against India. On the same day conflict broke out between India and Pakistan, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed levies on an insecticide shipped from India. Chinese state media said the levies were a signal to those who seek to cut deals with the United States at China’s expense. In response to that particular round of levies, Chinese social media accounts said the retaliation follows India’s imposition of a 12 percent levy on some steel imports from China.

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China Makes Diplomatic Progress With Taliban: Wang hosted his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts in Beijing on May 21 for an informal trilateral meeting. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, talks were aimed at resuming diplomatic ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan after nearly four years. The two countries expressed a desire to elevate diplomatic relations and agreed, in principle, to exchange ambassadors. Wang reaffirmed China will “continue to provide assistance for the improvement of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.” He also announced that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will extend into Afghanistan. Those talks followed a deadly several years in which Baloch and Taliban insurgents have conducted cross-border terrorist attacks in mineral-rich Baluchistan, Pakistan’s westernmost province. Those attacks have targeted Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects, which have caused tension between China and Pakistan. China has also expressed concern over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Uyghur Islamist organization founded in Pakistan, alleging that its members use Afghan territory to stage attacks against China. Since the meeting between China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Pakistan has re-upped efforts to crack down on Baluchistan insurgent groups. Signs suggest Pakistan is taking China’s concerns over terrorist disruption to business seriously.

China-ASEAN Free Trade Negotiations: Commerce Minister Wang Wentao announced China had finalized an update to its existing free trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although negotiations have continued for two years, a Chinese analyst suggested the talks were expedited following President Donald Trump’s tariff announcement in April. The deal purports to include new sections on the digital economy, green economy, supply-chain connectivity, and customs procedures. During the press conference, Wang told his counterparts, “There are no winners in a tariff war or trade war.”

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ASEAN-GCC Meeting: As the rotating chair of ASEAN, Malaysia hosted the bloc’s inaugural summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, on May 27. Additionally, Kuala Lumpur convened the ASEAN-GCC-China Economic Summit, attended by Chinese Premier Li Qiang. China is Southeast Asia and the Gulf’s largest trading partner, and China sees ASEAN and the GCC as vehicles to coordinate a response to the Trump administration’s tariff war. Li said China, ASEAN, and the GCC should uphold “true multilateralism.” President Xi Jinping traveled to Malaysia last month, where he made countering Trump’s trade threats a focal point of his visit. Under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia has strengthened its relationship with China while also developing closer ties with GCC countries and other Arab states.

Li Meets With Prabowo: To mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of bilateral relations, Li visited Indonesia prior to the ASEAN-GCC-China Economic Summit. Li told Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto that China was interested in cooperating on finance, new energy, the digital economy, artificial intelligence, aerospace, and the maritime sector. Prabowo lauded China’s support for Palestinian statehood, an issue of resonance in the world’s most populous Muslim country. He also said Indonesia views China as a “decisive partner” in negotiations for a code of conduct in the South China Sea. During Prabowo’s November visit to Beijing, he appeared to accept China’s illegal territorial claims, which the Indonesian Foreign Ministry later retracted. The pair signed a memorandum of understanding to promote bilateral transactions in local currencies.

Beijing also demonstrated interest in one of Prabowo’s flagship initiatives. The free nutritious meals program aims to feed eighty-three million schoolchildren, toddlers, and pregnant women. To support that effort, the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia signed a memorandum of understanding with the head of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce to build one thousand jointly operated kitchens.

China-Philippines Confrontation in the Spratly Islands: The Philippines’ fisheries bureau said a marine scientific research initiative was accosted by the Chinese coast guard near the Spratly Islands on May 21. The Chinese coast guard fired water cannons and sideswiped one of the Philippine ships that was collecting sand samples, later accusing them of illegally entering waters near Subi Reef and Sandy Cay. The fisheries bureau said it was the first time water cannons had been used in Sandy Cay, which was the site of dueling territorial claims by China and the Philippines last month.

Earlier in May, China released the new white paper “China’s National Security in the New Era,” which highlighted the government’s prioritization of its illegal South China Sea claims. The document outlined its fundamental national defense aims, which included “safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security,” as well as protecting Beijing’s perceived “maritime rights and interests.” The Ministry of Defense stated, “China exercises its national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea.”

Golden Dragon Military Exercises: Cambodia hosted its largest-ever bilateral military exercise with China at Ream Naval Base. The annual joint exercise began in 2016; this year’s iteration focused on counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance operations. Cambodian President Hun Manet held an official inauguration for the naval base’s expansion last month, which China helped fund. Cambodia has repeatedly dismissed U.S. concerns that Cambodia offered China special access to the port’s facilities.

China-Vietnam Train Route Restarts: China and Vietnam restarted a train route from Hanoi to Nanning in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region that was suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic. The revived transportation route promises to further increase tourism between the two countries.

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.