China in Latin America: March 2025
from China Strategy Initiative
from China Strategy Initiative

China in Latin America: March 2025

The entrance of the Balboa Port after Hong Kong's CK Hutchison Holdings agreed to sell its interests in a key Panama Canal port operator to a BlackRock-backed consortium, amid pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump.
The entrance of the Balboa Port after Hong Kong's CK Hutchison Holdings agreed to sell its interests in a key Panama Canal port operator to a BlackRock-backed consortium, amid pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump. Enea Lebrun/Reuters.

In March, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said her government would review tariffs on Chinese imports. Venezuela boosted oil exports to China in the face of U.S. sanctions and questions over the extension of Chevron’s license to operate in the South American country. CK Hutchison Holdings agreed to sell its majority ownership of two ports at either end of the Panama Canal to BlackRock.

March 28, 2025 3:25 pm (EST)

The entrance of the Balboa Port after Hong Kong's CK Hutchison Holdings agreed to sell its interests in a key Panama Canal port operator to a BlackRock-backed consortium, amid pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump.
The entrance of the Balboa Port after Hong Kong's CK Hutchison Holdings agreed to sell its interests in a key Panama Canal port operator to a BlackRock-backed consortium, amid pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump. Enea Lebrun/Reuters.
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Trade

In her March 6 daily press conference, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said her government will review tariffs on Chinese imports, citing their impact on local industry. She linked cheap Chinese shoe and textile imports to rising violence in the Mexican state of Guanajuato, a shoe and textile manufacturing hub. Her remarks came just hours before U.S. President Donald Trump temporarily rescinded a 25 percent tariff on most Mexican goods. Days earlier, her administration announced that it would review its tariff on welding wire from China, and launched anti-dumping investigations into imports of hot-rolled steel from China and Vietnam, as well as certain aluminum products from China and the United States.

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Peru’s National Society of Industries called on the government to impose provisional anti-dumping duties on hot-rolled carbon steel tubes from China, citing preliminary evidence of price discrimination and negative impacts on domestic producers.

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China’s General Administration of Customs halted beef imports from six South American companies: three in Brazil, two in Argentina, and one in Uruguay. At least some reportedly failed to meet China’s registration requirements, according to the Brazilian Association of Meat Exporting Industries. The move comes as Beijing investigates last year’s record beef imports amid oversupply and domestic prices at multiyear lows. The investigation’s findings are expected later this year. Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay remain among China’s largest beef suppliers.

Diplomacy

Over twenty governments, including Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, elected Suriname’s Foreign Minister Albert Ramdin to lead the Organization of American States as secretary-general. China had openly backed Ramdin, who has expressed support for the “One China” policy and China’s growing role in Suriname’s development. Ramdin’s only opponent, Paraguayan Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez Lezcano—more skeptical of Chinese influence in the region—unexpectedly withdrew from the race on March 5, citing insufficient support for his candidacy.

Following Trump’s joint address to Congress on March 4, China’s Ambassador to Colombia posted on X: “In 1823, the U.S. launched the Monroe Doctrine against Latin America, raising its big stick. In 2025, the U.S. threatens Latin America, raising its big stick once again. Predators have never changed, but Latin America has—and it is no longer alone.”

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Asked during China’s Two Sessions about U.S. ambitions for the Panama Canal, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Latin American countries “want independence and autonomy, not the Monroe Doctrine.” He added that China has “no geopolitical calculations” in Latin America: “The region is no one’s backyard.”

China’s Ambassador to Nicaragua welcomed the country’s February constitutional reform, which named current President Daniel Ortega’s wife as copresident, extended both of their terms from five years to six, and consolidated their power over the press, the Catholic Church, and civil society.

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Infrastructure

An investment group led by BlackRock signed a memorandum of understanding to buy CK Hutchison Holdings’ majority ownership of two ports at either end of the Panama Canal. Washington had claimed that Hong Kong–based Hutchison could provide a backdoor for China to exploit the canal to the United States’ detriment. The acquisition also includes port operations in Mexico and the Bahamas.

The sale reportedly frustrated Chinese President Xi Jinping, in part because CK Hutchison moved forward without prior approval from Chinese authorities. Though the deal does not require their sign-off, Xi’s government has launched a multiagency review of the deal for potential security or antitrust violations. A senior-level delegation has also flown to Panama to meet with political leaders.

Ecuador’s government awarded and subsequently terminated a contract to develop the country’s most productive oilfield with a consortium led by Chinese state–owned Sinopec, arguing the consortium failed to disburse a $1.5 billion premium. China’s Embassy in Ecuador expressed hope that the parties would continue the project “based on mutual benefit.”

Honduras’ National Electric Power Company awarded a contract to develop a battery energy storage system to a consortium comprising China’s Windey and Spain’s Equinsa. The system should begin operations in late 2025.

Nicaragua’s Ministry of Energy and Mines granted Chinese company Brother Metal S.A. a twenty-five-year open-pit mining concession to extract metals and nonmetallic minerals near the Honduran border. Since 2023, the Ortega administration has granted seventeen mining concessions to Chinese companies.

Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that it is reviewing a 2016 agreement between China’s National Astronomical Observatory (NAOC) and a private Chilean university to build a joint astronomical observatory in Chile’s Atacama Desert. In December, Newsweek reported that, as part of the agreement, the NAOC could exclude Chileans from part of the site. The U.S. State Department expressed concern shortly thereafter regarding the project’s potential dual-use capabilities, including satellite monitoring, intelligence gathering, and military space operation support.

Investments

China’s commerce ministry has delayed approval for BYD’s planned electric vehicle (EV) factory in Mexico, citing concerns that Mexico could leak BYD’s smart car technology to the United States.

Carlos Tejada, deputy general manager of Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Peru—a subsidiary of Hong Kong–based Cosco—said that the Chinese government is preparing a surge of investment around Peru’s Chancay megaport, which opened in November 2024. Among the potential projects he mentioned are a BYD electric vehicle assembly plant, a transformer manufacturing facility, and a Huawei regional logistics hub. Cosco’s conditions for these investments include the creation of a Private Special Economic Zone (ZEEP) in Chancay, which would give companies preferential tax rates and streamlined customs procedures. A bill establishing the ZEEP awaits congressional ratification but Peru’s finance minister recently announced a pilot program that would apply a 0 percent income tax to companies operating in both Chancay and Callao, Peru’s largest port.

El País reported that China Petroleum might be interested in taking over Chevron’s operations in Venezuela, should Trump choose not to extend Chevron’s license to pump there. In the meantime, Venezuela is increasing its oil exports to China to the highest level in nearly two years.

Security

China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper titled “Controlling Fentanyl-Related Substances: China’s Contribution,” describing China’s efforts to curb the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals to Mexico.

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China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.