Russia-China-Ukraine: March 2025
from China Strategy Initiative
from China Strategy Initiative

Russia-China-Ukraine: March 2025

Chinese Foreign Minister Wag Yi, stands with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazeem Gharibabadi, before a meeting regarding the Iranian nuclear issue at Diaoyutai State Guest House on March 14, 2025.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wag Yi, stands with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazeem Gharibabadi, before a meeting regarding the Iranian nuclear issue at Diaoyutai State Guest House on March 14, 2025. Pool via REUTERS

China, Russia, and Iran met to call for an end to U.S. Sanctions on Iran and conducted joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman. China continues to present itself as a potential peace-broker in the Russia-Ukraine war but has openly refrained from joining the Coalition of the Willing. It has slightly pulled back from its purchases of Russian oil and developed rail lines that bypass Russia.

April 3, 2025 3:01 pm (EST)

Chinese Foreign Minister Wag Yi, stands with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazeem Gharibabadi, before a meeting regarding the Iranian nuclear issue at Diaoyutai State Guest House on March 14, 2025.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wag Yi, stands with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazeem Gharibabadi, before a meeting regarding the Iranian nuclear issue at Diaoyutai State Guest House on March 14, 2025. Pool via REUTERS
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Russia-China-Iran: Representatives from China, Iran, and Russia met on March 14 to discuss efforts to end U.S. sanctions on Iran that were imposed in response to that country’s nuclear program. The joint statement concluding the talks called for “terminating all unlawful unilateral sanctions,” as China and Russia “welcomed Iran’s reiteration that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.” This meeting comes as the Donald Trump administration is pushing for renewed nuclear talks with Iran.

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AP reports that for the fifth year, China, Iran, and Russia conducted joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman near the Strait of Hormuz as part of the “Maritime Security Belt 2025.”  Despite not having a significant patrol presence in the Middle East, continued cooperation with Iran is a priority for China and Russia. China is “by far the largest importer of Iranian oil,” according to the U.S. Department of State. Russia, meanwhile, has consistently used drones from Iran in its war effort.

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Trade: There has been a massive increase in imports of Chinese-made vehicles, as “Chinese vehicle exports to Russia last year hit seven times the level of 2022” according to the Financial Times. Chinese vehicle companies, including Chery, Geely, and Great Wall Motor, now make up 63 percent of the Russian market. Cited reasons for this include Russia’s lack of access to Western companies due to the war in Ukraine and “anti-dumping measures” that hindered exports of Chinese cars to the United States, European Union (EU), and more. In response, Russia has increased “recycling fees,” or import taxes, to the equivalent of $7,500 USD for passenger cars, in hope of increasing domestic production.

According to Reuters, China has pulled back from its purchases of Russian oil due to, in the view of the publication, the increase of U.S. sanctions on Russian oil producers and vessels. This has impacted oil prices and put more strain on Russia’s economy. This month, Sinopec and Zhenhua Oil halted their purchases, while PetroChina and CNOOC reduced import volumes. Some Chinese companies want to “assess compliance” with sanctions and track Russia-Ukraine negotiations before taking further steps.

Railway: In a March 3 statement, Kazakhstan’s State Railway company announced a new freight transit line from China to Europe that will go through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey, circumventing Russia. Eurasianet reports that China is also in the process of establishing two other routes that will bypass Russia and travel through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.

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Economy: To get past sanctions, Russian oil companies are using cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin and ether, and stablecoins, such as Tether, to trade with China and India, something actively encouraged by the Russian government. This helps with converting yuan and rupees into roubles. Reuters quotes an anonymous source explaining that “a Chinese buyer of Russian oil pays a trading company acting as a middleman in yuan into an offshore account” and then “the middleman converts this into crypto and transfers it to another account and from there, it is sent to a third account in Russia and converted to roubles.”

At International Forums: According to the Financial Times, on March 16 Chinese President Xi Jinping rejected an invitation from the European Union to attend a summit in Brussels to mark the fifty-year anniversary of China-EU diplomatic relations. Chinese Premier Li Qiang, who typically attends the annual bilateral summits in Brussels, is set to take Xi’s place, despite the EU’s hopes to commemorate the anniversary with the Chinese president’s presence.

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China Pushes for Multilateral Peace Plan: On March 5, China’s Special Representative to the European Union Lu Shaye openly criticized the Trump administration for its treatment of its European allies and Ukraine throughout the peace process. Shaye accused President Trump of having a “brazen and domineering policy towards Europe,” further suggesting that the peace process must include all involved parties rather than a “select few” dictating the discussions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated this sentiment in a call with French diplomatic advisor Emmanuel Bonne on March 19. Wang stressed China’s commitment to ensuring Europe’s role in the peace process, adding that the process “should not only serve the interests of any one country.”

As talks began in Saudi Arabia between U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning expressed hopes that “a just and lasting solution that is acceptable to all sides” could be reached. She also highlighted China’s commitment to “play a constructive role” within the international community to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war. On March 18, a spokesperson for the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) stated China’s intent to “provide assistance within our capacity,” adding that China would help in the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine. Furthermore, following the announcement of a thirty-day partial ceasefire on energy infrastructure after talks between Putin and Trump, China’s foreign ministry expressed support for the agreement, calling it a “necessary step towards peace.”

China and the “Coalition of the Willing”: As the United Kingdom and France lead a “coalition of the willing,” drawing up a plan to deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine, a report by German media outlet Die Welt on March 22 claimed that China had reportedly considered joining the peacekeeping mission. The prospect of Chinese participation in the coalition—which consists of over thirty countries including Canada, Turkey, and other NATO members—raised hopes that Russia could warm up to the idea of a NATO or any peacekeeping force stationed in Ukraine. However, China’s Foreign Ministry in Beijing labeled the reports as “completely untrue,” reiterating that China maintains a “consistent and clear” stance on the Russia-Ukraine war.

After a meeting on March 27 between French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot and Wang, Barrot emphasized that China “has a role to play in convincing Russia to come to the negotiating table.” Without actively mentioning Ukraine, Wang stated that all involved parties should “uphold multilateralism” in confronting the world’s most pressing challenges. This meeting preceded a major summit between members of a “coalition of the willing” in Paris, where France and the United Kingdom stated they will move forward with their plan to deploy a peacekeeping force after a peace deal, despite its members failing to achieve unanimity. Following the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that Chinese President Xi could play an active role in pursuing a “solid and lasting peace” between Ukraine and Russia, especially given China’s status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Economic Cooperation: Chinese officials inked a deal with Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy, allowing Ukrainian seafood and pea exports to reach Chinese markets. The deal documents regulatory guidelines on the sanitation of peas and any aquatic products from natural waters.

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.