Trade Calendar

from Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and RealEcon

Trade Calendar

Trade and tariffs are a central part of President Donald Trump’s international economic policy. Stay up to date with the Council on Foreign Relation’s calendar of significant trade-related events.

Article by Allison J. Smith

Last updated June 4, 2025 10:00 am (EST)

Article: Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Overview

January 2025

February 2025

February 1, 2025: Trump imposes tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China

March 2025

March 1, 2025: Trump instructs Commerce to launch an investigation into lumber imports

March 2, 2025: Trump releases executive order amending de-minimis

March 3, 2025: Trump says he will impose tariffs on “external” agricultural products

March 3, 2025: Trump announces reciprocal tariffs to begin on April 2

March 4, 2025: Trump imposes 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and an additional 10 percent increase on China

March 4, 2025: Canada and China announce retaliatory tariffs, Mexico announces intent to implement retaliatory tariffs

March 4, 2025: Trump confirms use of reciprocal tariffs in address to Congress

March 5, 2025: Canada’s first set of retaliatory tariffs take effect

March 5, 2025: Trump speaks with Ford, GM, and Stellantis about auto tariffs

March 6, 2025: Trump adjusts auto tariffs on Canada and Mexico, including a one-month reprieve for goods under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)

March 5, 2025: Trump considers carveouts on agricultural tariffs to Canada and Mexico

March 7, 2025: Trump could impose additional tariffs on Canada, including on lumber and dairy products

March 7, 2025: Trump administration says it wants to pursue a free trade agreement with India

March 9, 2025: Mexico to announce retaliatory tariffs against the United States (never announced)

March 10, 2025: China’s retaliatory tariffs take affect

March 10, 2025: Ontario, Canada, imposes a 25 percent surcharge on electricity exported to Michigan, Minnesota, and New York

March 11, 2025: Trump threatens to impose 50 percent tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum

March 11, 2025: Trump says he will increase Canadian steel and aluminum tariffs another 50 percent

March 11, 2025: Comments on unfair trade practices due to USTR

March 11, 2025: Ontario, Canada, suspends a 25 percent surcharge on electricity exported Michigan, Minnesota, and New York

March 11, 2025: Trump suspends a 50 percent tariff threat on Canadian steel and aluminum

March 12, 2025: U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs take effect

March 12, 2025: EU imposes retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs

March 12, 2025: Canada announces $20.9 billion of retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs

March 13, 2025: Trump threatens 200 percent tariffs on alcohol from the European Union

March 13, 2025: Canada initiates a dispute complaint in the WTO against U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs

March 14, 2025: USTR tells Vietnamese counterpart to improve U.S.-Vietnam trade balance

March 17, 2025: Greer selects Jennifer Thornton as USTR general counsel

March 18, 2025: U.S. assents to enter consultations with Canada and China over tariffs

March 20, 2025: EU delays retaliatory tariffs to mid-April

March 21, 2025: EU to join Canadian WTO case against U.S. tariffs on aluminum and steel

March 24, 2025: Trump threatens tariffs of 25 percent on countries importing Venezuelan oil

March 24, 2025: Comments and public hearing on proposed action targeting Chinese shipbuilding due to USTR

March 26, 2025: Canada’s second set of retaliatory tariffs take effect

March 26, 2025: Trump announces auto tariffs

April 2025

April 1, 2025: Commerce, Treasury, and USTR deliver reports requested in the America First Trade Policy memorandum to Trump

April 2, 2025: Trump issues executive order on reciprocal tariffs

April 2, 2025: Trump issues executive order on amending de minimis

April 2, 2025: U.S. tariffs of 25 percent on countries importing Venezuelan oil to take effect

April 2, 2025: U.S. auto tariffs take effect

April 2, 2025: Canada’s second round of tariffs take effect

April 4, 2025: China announces 34 percent tariffs on U.S. goods to China

April 4, 2025: China announced restrictions on the export of six heavy rare earth metals

April 6, 2025: Trump said auto-tariff exemptions were set to expire this day

April 8, 2025: Trump issues executive order increasing tariffs on China from 34 percent to 84 percent under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule

April 8, 2025: Trump says pharmaceutical tariffs are coming soon

April 9, 2025: U.S. reciprocal tariffs take effect, including a total of 104 percent on China

April 9, 2025: China announces retaliatory tariffs of 84 percent

April 9, 2025: EU votes in favor of 10 to 25 percent retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products, including tobacco, motorcycles, poultry, steel, and aluminum

April 9, 2025: Trump announces a ninety-day pause on reciprocal tariffs, excluding China; U.S. tariffs on China increased to 125 percent

April 9, 2025: Trump issues executive order on U.S. shipbuilding and investigation into China’s unfair practices targeting maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding

April 10, 2025: EU announces a ninety-day pause on retaliatory tariffs against the U.S.

April 10, 2025: Chinese retaliatory tariffs of 84 percent take effect

April 10, 2025: ASEAN Economic Ministers issue [PDF] joint statement on U.S. tariffs

April 11, 2025: Trump issues executive order amend reciprocal tariffs to exclude semiconductors and electronics

April 11, 2024: China increases tariffs on U.S. imports to 125 percent

April 15, 2025: First round of EU retaliatory tariffs take effect (paused to July 14, 2025)

April 15, 2025: Trump issues executive order launching a 232 investigation into critical mineral imports

April 17, 2025: Trump issues executive order on the competitiveness of the U.S. seafood industry

April 23, 2025: USTR issues notice of proposed action in 301 investigation of China’s targeting maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding

April 29, 2025: Trump issues executive order amending tariffs on automobiles

April 29, 2025: Trump issues executive order removing cumulative effect of multiple tariffs on the same article

April 30, 2025: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to deliver report requested in the America First Trade Policy memorandum to Trump 

May 2025

May 2, 2025: Duty on per postal items from China and Hong Kong scheduled to increase to 75 dollars

May 4, 2025: Trump says he has authorized a 100 percent tariff on foreign movies

May 4, 2025: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issues a statement about concerns over escalating trade protectionism

May 7, 2025: Written comments for 232 investigation on pharmaceuticals due

May 11, 2025: Commerce to create process for including additional derivative steel articles in line with the February aluminum and steel tariffs

May 12, 2025: Trump issues executive order regarding most-favored-nation prescription drug pricing

May 12, 2025: The United States and China issue a joint statement reducing tariffs for 90 days

May 12, 2025: Trump issues executive order decreasing de minimis tariffs from 120 percent to 54 percent

May 16, 2025: Second round of EU retaliatory tariffs take effect (paused)

May 16, 2025: Trump says the administration will send negotiation letters to trading partners over the next two to three weeks

May 19, 2025: Written comments on proposed tariffs actions under 301 investigation of China’s targeting maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding due

May 23, 2025: Trump announces 50 percent tariffs on EU imports starting June 1

May 24, 2025: Trump releases World Trade Week Proclamation

May 25, 2025: Trump pauses 50 percent EU tariffs to July 9

May 28, 2025: U.S. Court of International Trade issues [PDF] order stating sweeping tariffs are illegal

May 29, 2025: D.C. District Court judge issues decision stating IEEPA does not authorize Trump’s sweeping tariffs.

May 29, 2025: The Trump administration appeals the Court of International Trade’s ruling and files motions to stay

May 29, 2025: U.S. Court of Appeals grants [PDF] the Trump administration’s request to temporarily pause Court of International Trade’s ruling

May 30, 2025: Trump accuses China of violating the Geneva Consensus

June 2025

June 1, 2025: De minimis on items from China and Hong Kong scheduled to to increase to 54 percent (formerly 120 percent)

June 4, 2025: Trump raises tariffs on all steel imports to 50 percent with the exclusion of the UK

June 4, 2025: Trump administration asks countries to submit their best trade offers by this date

June 5, 2025: Response [PDF] to Trump administration’s motions to stay due

June 9, 2025: Trump administration’s reply due [PDF] to Court of Appeals

June 11, 2025: Commerce to report most favored nation price targets for pharmaceutical manufacturers

June 15–17, 2025: Group of Seven Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta

June 16, 2025: Comprehensive seafood trade strategy due to the president

July 2025

July 6-7, 2025: BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro

July 9, 2025: U.S. ninety-day pause on reciprocal tariffs expires (including 50 percent on EU)

July 14, 2025: EU ninety-day pause on retaliatory tariffs expires

July 29–31, 2025: Third G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting

August 2025

August 10, 2025: U.S. and Chinese tariff reductions expire

August 12, 2025: OMB’s fiscal assessment reciprocal trade and tariffs policy due to Trump

September 2025

September 2025: African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) scheduled to expire

October 2025

October 2025: Sixteenth session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD16)

October 2025: USTR public consultations on 2026 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement review

October 6, 2025: U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) authorities expire

October 7–9, 2025: Fourth G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting

October 10, 2025: G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Ministerial Meeting

October 12, 2025: Final report and recommendations on critical minerals 232 investigation due to president

October 26–November 1, 2025: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Gyeongju, South Korea

November 2025

November 22, 2025: Commerce report on copper imports due for release

November 22–23, 2025: G20 Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa

December 2025

December 1, 2025: Third round of EU retaliatory tariffs take effect

December 23, 2025: Report from Joe Biden administration’s investigation of China’s pursuit of global semiconductor dominance due

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