What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests?

What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests?

A man passes a Danish flag ahead of Greenland’s general election in the island’s capital, Nuuk.
A man passes a Danish flag ahead of Greenland’s general election in the island’s capital, Nuuk. Marko Djurica/Reuters

The island’s residents have voted in favor of a party that seeks gradual independence from Denmark. But Greenland has attracted significant attention from President Trump, who sees the island’s considerable mineral wealth and location in the Arctic as necessary for U.S. national security.

March 13, 2025 12:42 pm (EST)

A man passes a Danish flag ahead of Greenland’s general election in the island’s capital, Nuuk.
A man passes a Danish flag ahead of Greenland’s general election in the island’s capital, Nuuk. Marko Djurica/Reuters
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U.S. President Donald Trump continues to press for the U.S. acquisition of Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of Denmark and the world’s largest island. Trump’s renewed interest—he made similar statements as president in 2019—is rooted in the Arctic territory’s economic and strategic qualities. “We need Greenland for national security,” Trump said in his March address to Congress.

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U.S. forces currently operate a military base on Greenland, and the United States and Denmark are NATO allies with a long-running bilateral defense partnership that includes shared patrols around Greenland. Trump’s repeated comments about acquiring the island have fueled its push for greater autonomy and independence from Denmark.

What is Greenland’s status?

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Greenland has been considered a Danish territory for more than three hundred years, but it wasn’t until 1979 that Denmark granted the sparsely populated island home rule. In 2009, Denmark passed the Act on Greenland Self-Government [PDF], significantly expanding the island’s authority over its domestic affairs, including the police, courts, and coast guard. Denmark still maintains control over Greenland’s foreign affairs, defense policy, and monetary policy, providing an annual subsidy of approximately $500 million.

As part of Denmark, which is a founding member of NATO, Greenland is covered under the transatlantic alliance’s security guarantees. However, Greenland is not a member of the European Union (EU) or the European Single Market despite being considered an overseas country and territory associated with the EU. Greenland’s roughly fifty-seven thousand citizens, the majority Indigenous Inuit, are EU citizens as well as Danish nationals.

In recent years, Greenland has witnessed a growing independence movement. Under the self-government act, the island can gain independence via a referendum with approval from the Danish Parliament. In 2023, Greenland unveiled its first draft constitution, calling for the creation of a Greenlandic republic, independence from Denmark, and recognition of the island’s Inuit heritage. In mid-March, Greenland’s center-right Demokraatik party—which advocates for a gradual approach to independence—won the island’s parliamentary election, underscoring residents’ desire for greater sovereignty.

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Why does the Trump administration want Greenland?

Trump has repeatedly said that acquiring Greenland is critical to U.S. national security. Greenland’s location between Europe and North America and its proximity to the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans makes it strategically important for military and defense purposes—particularly in monitoring increasing Chinese and Russian military activity in the region. While the United States already has a military base on Greenland, full control over the island could enable Washington to expand its influence in air and naval operations in the Arctic, as well as space. 

“Greenland is growing in importance as we find ourselves in a global competition with China and in a new technological revolution with regards to warfare,” Rebecca Pincus, director of the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “So, Greenland is important from a missile-defense perspective, from a space perspective, and from a global competition perspective.”

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There are also economic incentives. Rising temperatures associated with climate change are making Greenland’s rare earth metals such as lithium, a critical mineral for electric vehicles and batteries, more accessible. A 2023 report by the Danish government detailed Greenland’s potential as a deposit of critical raw materials, many of which are used in the green energy transition. (The United States currently relies heavily on China for rare earth minerals.) Greenland is also believed to possess enormous untapped oil and gas reserves; a 2008 estimate by the U.S. Geological Survey put the amount at approximately thirty-one billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE)—the amount of energy contained in one barrel of crude oil—though the island banned all oil and gas exploration in 2021 over environmental concerns.

Meanwhile, Greenland’s ice sheet, which covers roughly 80 percent of the island, is experiencing accelerating melting, making Arctic trade routes more navigable; these include the Northeast and Northwest Passages. Greater availability could potentially open up shorter and faster trade routes between Asia, Europe, and North America, positioning Greenland as an international maritime hub.

Could the Trump administration acquire Greenland?

Trump’s push to take Greenland echoes other territorial aims expressed at the start of his second term, including regaining control of the Panama Canal—which the United States officially turned over to Panama in 1999—and making Canada the fifty-first U.S. state. 

The United States could legally acquire Greenland with the consent of the Danish government, which would also hinge on the agreement of Greenland’s self-ruling parliament. (The United States made such a purchase when it bought Alaska from Russia in 1867.) Some experts say Washington could also pursue a Compact of Free Association with Greenland, establishing a relationship where the territory is self-governing but still closely tied to the United States for economic assistance and defense. The United States has these treaties already in place with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. However, such a deal would still require approval from both the Greenlandic and Danish governments.

Greenland’s Prime Minister Múte B. Egede has affirmed the island’s sovereignty and said it wants to keep moving forward with its independence movement. “We don’t want to be Danish, we don’t want to be American, we want to be Greenlandic,” he said in mid-January and reiterated following Trump’s March address to Congress. Danish leaders have said that Greenland is “not for sale” and that while Copenhagen would like to keep the island part of the Kingdom of Denmark, it respects Greenlanders’ decision to choose their own path forward. Meanwhile, Greenland officials have told the Trump administration that they are open to enhancing the existing bilateral defense partnership on the island. 

Supporters of Greenland’s ruling Inuit Ataqatigiit party react during the general election, in Nuuk.
Supporters of Greenland’s ruling Inuit Ataqatigiit party react during the general election, in Nuuk. Marko Djurica/Reuters

Trump has not ruled out using military force to take control of the island. However, forcefully doing so would constitute a rebuke of national sovereignty, a cardinal principle of international relations and U.S. foreign policy. The United States has long eschewed wars of conquest, and it hasn’t made large purchases of foreign territory for more than a century. The last such instance was the Woodrow Wilson administration’s 1917 purchase of the U.S. Virgin Islands from Denmark—primarily for military reasons—for $25 million. 

Trump has also threatened to impose tariffs on Denmark if it doesn’t cede or sell Greenland. The United States is the top non-European export market for Denmark, with the latter sending mainly pharmaceutical products and medical tools, totaling some $12 billion in 2023.

What’s the United States’ history with Greenland?

During World War II, the U.S. military built a significant wartime presence on the then Danish colony, helping to patrol and protect it from Axis powers and supporting various Allied operations. Denmark itself was occupied by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945. 

President Harry Truman viewed postwar Greenland as a prime location for permanent U.S. military assets that could detect and counter major air strikes—including nuclear strikes—by the Soviet Union. In 1951, the United States signed a treaty with Denmark that allowed Washington to retain its military bases on Greenland, as well as establish new bases or “defense areas” if NATO deemed necessary.

Today, the only operable U.S. base on Greenland is Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), which was created in 1951 and has been under U.S. Space Force command since 2020. The northernmost U.S. military base, Pituffik is home to approximately two hundred active-duty personnel as well as missile defense and space surveillance equipment—including radar that provides early warnings and detection for intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from Russia.

What are other world powers doing around Greenland?

Eight countries, including the United States, have territory in the Arctic. In recent years, Western powers have raised concerns about Chinese and Russian expansionism in the region.

Russia boasts the largest territorial presence in the Arctic, with its border making up more than 50 percent of the Arctic coastline. In recent years, Russian military activity in the region—which peaked during the Soviet Union era—has increased. Additionally, experts say Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has threatened its relations with other Arctic states; the outbreak of war prompted Finland and Sweden to join NATO. 

China, too, has boosted its regional presence, calling itself a “near-Arctic state” and seeking to increase its economic and military role there. China has four icebreaking vessels, for example—compared to Russia’s roughly forty and the United States’ one—and has sought to access the region’s natural resources and establish new trade routes. In a 2014 speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated the country’s desire to become a so-called polar power. In 2024, China sent three icebreakers into Arctic waters for the first time. Together, China and Russia have conducted joint military exercises in the Arctic, sparking concern among U.S. officials.

Canada, the Arctic country closest to Greenland, has also taken steps aimed at bolstering security and defense in the Arctic. In recent years, Ottawa published its Arctic and Northern Policy Framework—laying out a vision for Canada’s activities and investments in the region—and released a North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization plan to enhance North America’s defense capabilities against evolving regional threats. Earlier this year, U.S. and Canadian military forces conducted joint exercises in Greenland as part of an air defense operation. More recently, Canada completed an annual naval military exercise in the Arctic alongside several allies, including the United States and United Kingdom, that is designed to enhance Canada’s regional defense capabilities.

Michael Bricknell and Will Merrow created the graphics for this article.

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